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PREFACE 
In 1962, the United States Supreme Court handed down its opinion in the 
Regents' l'rayer case. .As a result of the decision, the Court was accused of 
disregarding Constitutional principles and perverting the intentions of the 
Founding Fathers by outlawing God and prayer from the public schools. As a 
lawyer, I was disturbed by the vicious nature of the att~eks on the Court; as 
a parent, I was concerned over the divisive effect of the controversy on the 
schools and the community; and, as a student, I was curious to know exactly 
what the Court and the Founding Fathers said, and why. This curiosity led me 
to a study of the writings of the Constitutional period as well as the deci-
sions of todayc 
The first part of my study concerns the meaning of "religious freedomtt as 
revealed through the fundamental laws of the Constitutional period. In the 
course of my research, I have compiled and noted ever.; mention of religion in 
the State Constitutions and Bills of Rights drafted between 1776 and 1791. I 
have read the Declaration of Independence, Articles of Confederation and the 
Northwest Ordinance; the Debates in the Constitutional Convention, the State 
Ratifying Conventions, and the First Congress, and extracted ever.; significant 
mention of religion. I have not looked behind the words to the actual prac-
tice, but rather to the words and phrases themselves, seeking different ways in 
which a similar idea can be expressed, thus clarifying the meaning of that idea. 
(I am concerned with what people ~ rather than what they did; the fact that 
in some instances these pronouncements were honored more in the breach than in 
the observance does not make them any less valid as criteria of what the people 
thought the law ought to be.) 
The second part of my study concerns the interpretation of the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment by today's Supreme Court, particularly in rela-
tion to the schools. I have studied the recent Supreme Court decisions; State 
laws concerning religion, the public schools and the public purse; public re-
action to the Court; Congressional hearings on proposed Constitutional Amend-
ments to "put God back in the schools"; Law Review articles, and much of the now 
extensive body of literature which disects, analyzes, criticizes, praises, and 
vilifies the Supreme Court and its precedent-making decision. 
This study would have been impossible without the hGlp and cooperation of 
a great many people - my debts are many, my gratitude heartfelt. I am espe-
cially grateful to the College-Faculty Program of the American Association of 
University Women for the initial grant which made my return to academia pos-
sible; to my parents for their continued support, both moral and financial; 
and to Mrs. Jacqueline Larsen who did the typing with skill and unlimited pa-
tience. I am indebted to Dro Noble Cunningham, and to Dr. Stanley Friedelbaum 
of Rutgers - the State University, in whose seminars I first became interested 
in the subject matter of this study, for their comments, criticisms, and sugges-
tions; to Dro Barry Westin, for many hours spent in reviewing assorted rough 
drafts of the manuscript and for his invaluable analysis and critique; and to 
my advisor, mentor, and friend, Dr. Spencer Albright, Jr., my very special 
thanks, for without his inspiration and guidance, this thesis might never have 
been completed. And finally, to my husband, Stephen - chief critic and morale 
booster - my eternal gratitude for his patience and understanding, and for his 
encouragement of this housewife's ambitions for a second career. 
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PROLOGUE 
Learned Hand, one of our most respected JUrJ.8ts. described. the Com:titution 
and Bill of Rig~ts as the 
••• altogether human expression of the w111 of the s b t.e ~cmven tions 
that ratifi.ed them; •. t_h_exr meal'l1_ng: :1.!:'. to b.e _r,:a.t.h_e£.p_C!- .fro.~ ~P-~. 
words they contaj._!!, read in the historical setting JI~ ~.!,.)ich they 
~g_. uttttes!_~ _(Emphasis supp1 j edV" 
To give meaning to the word:1 of these documents nertaimne to relie,-ion, I have 
attemptP.d to collect and examine all the similar words uttered in analagou~ 
circumstances by the people of the neH nation, 
We are a nation that likes to haue things i:r. wrtt.ing In the period f ron 
the Declaration of Independence to thP nill of Rtghts, the hopes, ideals~ as-
pirations - and prejudices - of the new nation were written into law.. In those 
fifteen yea.rs many documentfl renremmtin,7' thr> ftmfaroen tal leH 0f thP- lanrl w0rP 
drafted by the representatives of the people. P. statute or even a c0n8titution 
does not usually represent the exact views of any one person or group; however. 
through compromise and discussion, through the interplay of ideas, the e.ction 
and interaction of competing and diverse points of view, there is an expression 
of composite opinion which does reflect the intentions ~ind aspirations of the 
people as a whole. It is my hone that an examination of all these documents,. 
together with the debates which were prolof-Ue to the adoption of the Constitu-
ti on and the Bill of Rights, might _reveal an (~ ~; titude, a collective opinion -
1Learned Hand, ~ Bill of 3.ights ( Cambri<lge: ~larva.rd Press, 1958), p, ·5. 
? 
a consensus, if you will - which will illuminate the meaning of ''the words they 
contain" concerning religious libertyo 
It is an astonishing- fact that the United States Supreme Court did not ruJ.E, 
in any substantial way on the meaning of the Establishment clause of the First 
Amendment until 1947,? The .S:.YJU:~O.!!. case3 upheld the cons ti tutionali ty of tax-
supported school b11ses for parochial school children and, for the first time, 
spelled out a "wall l)f separation" between church and st~te bt'tsed on this 
clause •. Both the majority and minority in this five-to-four decision b~se~ 
their reasoning on the Virginia Statute for Relig-ious FrP.edom, Madison's Memor-
ial and Re"lonstrance, and .Jefferson's "wall of separation" letter. There have 
been six more ~stablishment cases decided since then; the most controversial is 
4 the New York 13oard of Regents' Prayer case, Vehement p~·otests from all segments 
of society immediately followed this decision in which the Supreme Court held 
the recitation of a state-prescril>ed and state-sanctioned prayer in the public 
schools unconstitutional, The court was accused, among other things, of being 
Godless. Over 170 amendments to the Constitution have been submitted to the 
House Judiciary Committee to put God .and prayer back into the schools, and to 
correct the court's obvious "misinterpretation" of the intentions of the Found-
ing t'a the rs. 5 
How does the Court decide the meaning of a Statute written 175 years ago. 
on a point that could not possibly have been present in the minds of the men 
who draftetl .. the legislation? The probleru-·be·comes tlouL1-:-r·diffi:cu1t·when ±t 
2Robert F. Dri'!'l.an, Reliz.0.IL the . .Qourts and Public ?olicy (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1963), p.3. 
?Eve.£.S..9..11 Y. ! .J3EJ!!..<'L9f ];.du CJl.t.:i.oJLQf~_t.l:l.e~ __ T.o_wni;i)'.l_i_P_ 1?..L· E~.zinz, .. 330 U, s. L, ( 194 7) • 
4 . ' Engl~.Y.· .Vi.tale, 370 U.S, 4211 (1962). 
5~ Hagazine, May 8, 1964, pp.63~4: Murray Kempton, "Vessels of Christ," 
The New Rcnublic, May 16, 1964, p.13. 
3 
concerns .such a . pe:rsonal, emotio!'lal, and fundamental liberty as freedom of re-
ligion •.. Every.schl)Ol boy knows that_ a hw requiring Congresrn:ien to be 5pitico-
p;.,.li:~:1"1, or requiring_ the teaching of. Catholic dogma in thf! publi.c schoolst or. 
ma.king church attendance mandatory-would be in violation of the Consti tutim al 
guarantees of freedom of religion and, consequently, void. The issues which 
conf:;:ont the Court today do not permit so simple a solution. The status of tax-
supported buses for parochial schools, chaplains in the service academies, 
Christmas ;:arols, voluntary prayers in the public schools, tax-exempti.ons for 
church property, and even ".In God We Truse~ have been or soon will be considered 
by the Court. 6 
There are two clauses in our fundamental be which togethe:- provide the 
statutory framework for religious freedom in the United States. The first is 
contained in the Constitution in the last sentence of Article VI: 
••• 1i·.:.t no religious test shall ever be required as qualification 
to any office or public trust under the United Sta~es. 
ar.·. :he other. Article I of the Eill of Rights: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; •. ,, 
6New York Times, Nov. 14, 1964, pe49; Aug" 19, 1966, p,9E, textbooks; 
Aug~··2r,- J.966, p.92, ·Vermont land use st:1tute for support of religious educa-
tion; Jee. 14, 1965, p.l, voluntary recitation of nursery school prayer, ete,; 
~~agazine, Sept. 3, 1965, p.68, church-run anti-poverty program. 
PART I 
Chapter I 
THE SOVE.l1EIGN :;T,~ TF.S 
During the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary period eleven of the thir-
teen original states drafted ConstitutiOiw~ B.ilfo of Hights, or both. These 
documents show a curious mixture of enlightenment and fearo There is, on the 
on3 hand, an almost triumphant recognition of the unalienable rights of man, 
and~ on the other hand, a hesitance, a reluctance, to r~cognize that these 
rights belong to all men - particularly if these men are too different. There 
is, however, a definite spirit of toleration which pervades these documents, 
though in some instances their provisions seem contradictory to us. There was 
in the minds of the good citizens considerable difference between allowing an 
"infidel" the right to believe and practice his religion and allowing him to 
hold an office of public trust. To many Americans of that day there was no 
conflict between "freedom of conscience'~ and prohibition against holding office. 
The Virginia Bill of Rights, which predates the Declaration of Independ-
enc~, ~~Ls forth the policy of that Commonwealth regarding religion in the much-
quoted Section 16. 
That reli,0.on, or that duty which we owe to our Creator, and the 
manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and convic-
tion, not by force or violence; and therefore all men are equally 
entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates 
of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to practice 
0hristinn forebearance, love and charity towards each other.l 
1Francis Newton Thorpe, 1'.h2, Federal w,! State Constitutions Colonial 
Charters and Other Orgap1,.c 1'fil!.! (Washington, DoC.: Government Printing 
Office, -ig09) , VII, 3814. Herinafter ref erred to as Thorpe. 
, . 
5 
Despite this~ a 1777 statute required church attendance and universal support 
of the established churcho The Anglican Church was disestablished in 1779, but 
it was not until 1786 wiih. the pa.ssage of Jefferson~s r•an Act for Establishing 
Religious Freedom" that separation of church and state was complete, 
The Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom is not technically within the 
scope of this study since it is not part of Virginiavs Bill of Rights or Con-. 
stitution. Ho\'lever, :Lts magnificent language is quoted so often as being rep-
resentative of the attitude of the day that it deserves incluston among the 
2 
"fundamental lawso." This·. statute emphatically states that "to compel a man to 
fu:-nish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions he disbeliP-ves, 
is sinful and tyrannicalJ' that civil rights have no dependence on religious 
opinions, and that 11 to suffer the civil magistrate to tnt:rude his powers into 
the field of opinion ••• is a dangerous failacy which at once destroys raligious 
liberty''; and that "truth is great and will prevail if left to herself," there-
fore be it enacted that 
no one be compelled to support or frequent any place of worship ..•• 
nor enforced. restrained. molested or burthened in his body or goods, 
nor she.11 suffer on account of his reliyious beliefs; • o o but all men 
shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain their opinion, 
in the matter of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, 
enlarge or effect their civil capacities •••• 
and further, that since these rights are the natural rights of mankind, any 
attempt to repeal or narrow the statute would be an infringement of natural 
righto3 After this statute was passed in 1786, there was no doubt as to 
Virginiags position with regard to religious freedomo 
Connecticut and Rhode Island, the two states which did not pass any 
~...-· .... "'--"';. __ .,. ._..._. ____ -----·-·----·,---
2See particul,~rly J!.V~E:).I.',S.OP. .. Y3 B.o.a.r,d. _.O,f_ J~d.'A,c,.a_t.i,OA. O.(.!_o.wnsh;i..I?. of Ewing. 
330 U.S. 1 (1947), where both the majority and minority cite the Statute to 
support their views. 
3nenry i1toele Commager (edo)~ Documents .i:r:!. American Jlistory (New York: 
Appleton-Centu~-y-Crofts, Inc,, 1949)~ p,125. 
6 
orgnnic laws during this periodt relied on their Chnrterso The only mention of 
:t'r.ligion jn the 1662 Connecticut Charter wa'1 a :rem~.nder to tb.e settlers of thei.r 
duty to C'?nvert the natives ''to Knowledge and Obedience of the only true GOD. 
~nd the ~~rwior of Mankind, and the Christian Faith." 4 Rhode Ishnd, with its 
lcmr; ~::c«dition of religious freedo!'l, had a unique provision in its royal Charter 
of ~66j. Granted by Charles II~ during the period of the religious wars, its 
religious freedom clause was far in advance of its time - an amazing expression 
of liberality and toleration: 
That our royall will and pleasure is, that noe person within the 
sayd colonyei at any tyme hereaftert shall bee any wise molested, 
punished, disquieted, or called :tn question, for any differences 
in opinione in matters of religion, and doe not actually disturb 
the civHl peace of our sayd colony; but that all and everye per-
son and persons nay from tyme to tyme and at all tymes herPafter, 
J.r:e.~.ly~e. .~PA .:f.µJ.lxe Jt@.Y..~ ~I}.d, ,e.n..i_o_Y.~ _ll!ll. _?_nd ~E. 2w:~~~ _judgment§. 
l£ld~ ~_qri.§~c,i..e.z:i.c..~s .• j.rJ. .11)..£1.tte,x.;"l. q.f.. .ri?J..~~~.OJ,t..§.. ..9_0.11.c.~ni~.!!.!E. ., , • and 
la'i>~e. statute, or clause, therein contayned, or to be contay21ed 1 
usage or custome of this realme, to the cont.rarY hereof, in 3ny 
wise, notwi thstand.ing" •.• (~;'l'lphasis supplied)5 
Pennsylvania's Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1776, recognized "that 
all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship /1lmighty God acc0rd:~n,c; 
to the dictates of their own consciences and u".l.derstandi'1g .... 116 e.nd t'rr:.t "-:o 
authority can or ought to be vested in or assumed by any power whatsoever, that 
shall in any casP- interfere with or in any manner control the right of con-
science in the free exercise of religious worship,'~ This echops a similar 
provision in the 1682 ''Frame of Government. 118 That sanie cJ!mse also states 
that no man who "acknowledges the J2!li..11!r of 1!_.Q.q,<!" .. can be deprived of any ci·.ri:J. 
0 
right as a citizen because of his "peculiar" mode of religious worship,./ ana 
no· man who is "conscientiously scrupulous'' of bearing arms shall be co'llpellet:l 
--·-..~ _.. .. , ___ .. _. ___ ... _,.,,.-..,.,, .... _.. .... -., . ..,.. _____ ... ,- ......... -_,.........,..._ .,. __ . ..._,.., 
A 
·Thorpe, T, 534. 7Ib"~ ··---~·' p.3063. 
5Ibid. 
--- ·• • . t 
VI, 321), 8Ibid. 
-· •• - 1 
p.3003. 
6r ·d oi .,,, Vi 3082, 9Tu.:i;Q._; 
7 
to do so.10 There was no requirement of belief in God before one might exercise 
one's right to vote,11 but all non-Christians were effectively prevented fro~ 
holding off ice by the requirement that office-holders take the following oath: 
I do believe ill one God, the creator and governor of the universe, 
the rewarder of the good and the punisher of the wicked. And I do 
acknowledge the scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given 
by Divine inspiration.12 
Pennsylvania drafted a second constitution in 1790 which modified this provis-
ion so that any person "who acknowledges the being of a God, and a future state 
of Rewards and punishments" shall not because of his religious beliefs be dis-
qualified for "any office or place of trust or profit under this common-
wealth.1113 The 1790 Constitution also made a very important addition to the 
provision regarding the rights of conscience "and that no preference shall ever 
be given by law, to ar1y religious establishments or modes of worship. 1114 Thus, 
in Pennsylvania by 1790 the law provided for freedom of conscience, no estab-
liohed church, and complete civil rights for all except atheists. 
The :~ortL Carolina Declaration of Rights of 1776, in language almost iden-
tical to tb:-.-L of Permsylvania, established the ttnatural and unalienable right 
to worship 1Umighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences, ,,lS 
and further "That there shall be no establishment of any one religion, church 
or denomination in this State in preference to any other ••• 1116 No man shall 
be compelled to support any church,17 but all persons shall be at liberty to 
exercise their own mode of worship: "Provided: That nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to exempt preachers of treasonable or seditious discourses 
from legal trial and punishment. 1118 Their distrust of the clergy was further 
evidenced by section XXXI which states that no clergyman could be a member of 
lOibid. l3Ibid., p.3100 16Ibid., p.2793. 
11-b.d 
.!...J:._., p.3082 • 14Ibid. 17Ibid. 
12Ibid., p.3084. 15Ibid.., p.2788. 18Ibid. 
t,he Senate~ House or Council ·~while he continues in the ex'.'lrcise of the pastoral 
f t• .. lg Th 20 
unc ion. ere were no religious qualifications for v0'..;.ng. howe\'Or~ 
offices or places of trust in the civil department were denied those who did not 
acknowledge ''the being of God or the huth of th" Protestant religion, or the 
diviue :mthority either of the Old or New 'l'estaments, or who shall hold reli-
gious principles incompatible with the fref'dom anJ :mfcty of the state. 1121 
The New Jersey Cons ti tutiori, pubhnhed . July 4. l'i"/6. makes no m€'"ltion of 
22 . 23 the Deity in its preamble,, - 'l"here rn no religious qualification for voting, 
nor is there any religious dfoquttli1'1ca~ion few Lo:1i..l1n1! offic.e/4 Ifo person 
within J;his colony shall ever be deprived of the 1.nestimah!e privilege of wor-
shi.pping "Almighty God in a manner ngreeablc to the dictates of his own con-
2- ?6 
science,'' ::> nor be required to p.'.lv titlws or taxes to mrnport any church., 
And farther '''l'hat there shall he no estahl:rnhment of any one religioufl sect in 
this Province, in preference to rmy other .,2'{ '!'hut name clause. however. 
goes c;1 to st1>.te "that no Protestant inhabitant of this Colony shall be denied 
the enjoyment 0f a"ly ci,ril right: merely on account of hin raligi0u<J princi-
1 ,. 2R ~ 'h · 11 1> t: t t i 11 b" C"P"ble of •i"'i.· ng elected to any p es . . . 11· :t. '.: at a . ro ,es an S Still " ,. n l ,, ,, 
office of public trust. It is interm:iting to note that this nrovision does 
not _P.rohil:>li..l?On-Protestants from holding office, 'l'his, coupled with a -~·urttcr 
provision that "no reJ.igious oath'' shall be required to hold office, 29 would 
indicate that the peo,le of New ,7er~:Jey,, in law if not in fact, had achieved 
complete religious freedom. 
The preamble of New York's Constitution, adopted April 177'7, quotcn t!le 
-.... ·-~' .... ~. _ ....... ,.._ 
191ltl-.~.·-··· 23Tb'd p,2595 . 27 Il?iq_.,_ .. l .. ____ ,. 
20
rbid. ~ ... ·~-- .. p.2790 24Ibisi_ 29 .. 1 . 1 .. Ll.!L.• 
21Ibid. 
- ·--' 
p.,2793., 25!bid. 
' ~- ~ p.2597 .. 29Ib d l ., -·-~· p.2598. 
22Ibid 
-•; p.2594, 26.Thic!, 
9 
1eclamtion of' Indopendenco in ito entirety.30 The quaUHcaUcns for votinff3l 
32 
and holding office do not include reliGi'lus rentrictions" t•!"'.nistero, prencl-t-
ers, priestsr et~. are not elig1blo to hold office whtlo perfonninp, their pas-
toral funct.i.on. 33 nnd one who is scrupulou::i of benring arms is exc110ed from no 
34 doing.. To ''guard agaj.nst that spiri tunl opprasuion and intolerance , • " thnt 
have scourged mankind.'' the people of New York throngh their represP.ntatives 
ordain, declare and detnrmine 
tha.t the free exorcise nnd erjoyment of rclir,ious profost\ion and 
worAhip, Without discriminntion :>r proferoncc Bhnll herenftnr be 
allowed within this StRte to all mankind •• ,3~ 
This is fellowed by the fairly cor.uno•1 prov:i.oion tha.t this shall not be con-
strue-d to oxr.use licentiouane:rn1 01' a brcnch of the rcnce, 
IJ.'he !"lolaware Constitution o• 1'{76 did ~oi; incor1,orate n Bill of High•:n .. 
fj 
'i'here were only two proviuiom1 relating to rolieion in that document.'' ·.\~ti-
cle 29 nt~.tt:.·~ .• "There oha.11 bo 1w estnbli~hmcnt of 1•ny one religiouo :met in 
this state in preferenco to nnother o, ,.':~· 7 and thnt "no minioter of tho ~onpel 
of any donomination ohnll be CErpablP. of holding civil of.f'ir:e :l.n this ntntn (l " • " 
3F3 while he continued jn th0 cixercise of hln p.(rntoral function.. Art"icle 22 sets 
forth the following 0•1th for office holdorrn 
I, AB, do profom1 fnith in God the ·'athor, 1mci in Jomw Cht·int Lio 
only Son, and. in the Holy Ghost 1 one God, blc•Jsed for eYerrn'>ro nnri 
l do 11cknowle1lg·e the Holy sc:ri rytur-:s of the Old and Nnw '.fostm::entn 
to be g~.ven l>y divine 1nspi.rat:i.on.~<) 
l'.:ighteen .YM.I'3 httcr. in 1792, a new C~Mtitution \tent into effect which in-
clu<led, in a rather word~' preamble, the acknowlcden:ent th11t 1'Throug}1 d:t\'ine 
30[b'd ")"2j 
__ ...L•, · p .... o • 3412.M.·· -~s )•.~jg_. 
31IbJ.~· I 1, .. <·c,·~ott 35JbiJ. p.2G:~6. 59 ' 
-- -· .. - ,. Ll'?.;\l· 
:;~Ibirl. ~6 
.!!rlQ.o 9 I, %~-63 . 
:;3Ibid. 
-- ' 
p. ;?6 :·,7. ·37Ibid. t p.566. 
Creator according to the dictates o-i: thE'i :r. conscrnnces , ,, ,:lC 
which is in effect a Hill of Rights, makes it quite clear thn t ''al thourrh it is 
the duty of all to worship the Author of the U•n.verse," "no man shall or ouGht 
to be compell~d to attend any religious service" or "to contribute to any church 
.. t ,.41 or min1.s er ••• nor shall any magistrate "interfere with or in any manner 
t 1 th . ht f ' . th f . f i · ' h •· 42 con ro , e rig s o conscience, in e ree exercise o re igious wars ip, 
nor shall any preference be given by law to any religious societien. denomina-
4"' ti.ons. or modes of worship.'' .J ~1ection 2 of th<it same article does away with 
the 1776 test oath in language identical to that of the United States Constitu-
llaryland, f~ou th Carolina, New Hampshire, and Massachu::iet ts were mor'? re-
:-. trictive in their provisions concerning religiono The Haryland Constitution 
of 1776 starts with a Declaration of Rights~ 
That as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner 
as h\:· thinks most acceptable to ,tlim;_ a'lJ. __ E..e_r_s_o_n_~_pEo_f_~-!?.1?.iEJL t~~-­
Christian rel.igi.on, are equally entifuc!. to trrotecti.on in .1h21!: 
.!:£li.gio~ libert:t, •• :-l"Emphasis supplied)4'5 
This is the only document drafted during thi~ µ~riocl which restricts protection 
of religi.ous J iberty to Christians. '_;his smne statute~ r:,ffirrn:.; th"lt a pcr~:o-'1 
should not be compelled to contri~ute to maintain any particular place of wor-
ship, 46 but that the legislature may "in their discretion11 lay a r;eneral and 
equal tax for the support of the Christian religion o". " 47 leaving to each indi-
vidual the choice of the particular church. 48 A declaration of belief in the 
Christian relidon is reouired for holding office; 49 however, ench person is 
·--~·----~ ............ --.. ~·-----~ --- .... ·--·-··- ....... ~.,-.---~-· ... - ---·····• 
401b1_· do • c·69 • P·::.> ,, 
·1 ') 
'+<e-b 'd 
..LL· 
44_l'Q.i'!o 
45J_Q_:i,Q. .. p.16990 
46J~bJ..c.!,o 
47Ib~-
48rb·.:i ~0 
!Ll790. 
11 
50 allowed to take the oath in accordance with his own relig!ous beliefs, and 
there is a special concession to Quakers 9 .Mennonites, and Dunl<:ers~ who were 
permitted to "affirm'' rather than .. swear, 1151 There were no relig:ious qualifica-
tions for votin~, but an oath or affirmation to support the state may be re-
52 quested. The Maryland distrust of the clergy iG evidenced by a provision -
whic:1, l'1 similar form, is still inco:rnorated in 'the Marylnnd Constitution -
which makes void the gift, devise~ or sale of lands. goods or chattels to any 
minister. r3li[ti.ous sect, etc., without the consent of the legislature.53 
Although it is not within the scope of this paper, it would be intf?resting t"' 
investigate bo forces in the coloninl experience of Haryland which led to 
rather restrictive clauses on religion in an otherwise liberal Bill of RiP"hts. 
1'hc 2outh Carol ~.na Constitutions reflect thQ a:.ibtv:i.lent feeHngs of the 
ucoplc towards religious liberty, The preamble of 1776 mentions the establish-
ment of the ;{omnn Catholicreli.gion in ~uobec o.n one of the causes uf ~·:outh 
Carolina'o discontent. 54 Qualifications foT' voting ar.d holding officl!!55 are 
established. ;°':' .hout mention of relieion, and the on'Jy oath rcquJ.r~d is to 
support the Constitutirm of South Carolina. 5G Two yearn later a new and more 
detailed con::~ 1 .;;.;.tion was adopted. Toleration WlW erantetJ. to 0 all persons nnd 
religious societ~.es who acknowledge that the:r(' L: one God, and a future state 
57 
of rewards and punishments, and that Gnd is publically to bo wc~·:~hippcd, '" On 
the one hand, "The Christian : rotestan!. religion is. hereby cc: :;titutcd ur.d tic-
clared to be the established. religion nf this state.•·58 On ~;Le other. hand, ''No 
r.9 person shall disturb or molest any. relir_'.ious assel!lbly, , . .J and "no person sh&ll 
55""b' l 
. . .:::-2L . • 
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be obliged to pay towards the maintenance and support of religious worship that 
he does not freely join in, or has voluntarily engaged to supporto 060 All offi-
cers of the state must be of the Protestant religion,61 and no person shall be 
eligible for a seat in the said Senate unless he be of the Protestant reli-
gion, 62 and no member of the clergy may hold office, 63 and ttevery free white 
man, and no other person, who acknowledges the being of a God, and believes in 
a future state of rewards and punishments ••• " shall qualify as an elector.64 
Still a third Constitution was ratified in 17900 The religious qualifications 
for voting65 and holding office66 were dropped~ as was the establishment clause, 
but prohibition against the clergy holding office67 was retainedo Article VIII 
provided in language identical to the 1777 New York Declaration of Rights that 
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profeaeion and worship, 
without discrimination or preferencej shall forever hereafter be 
allowed within this State to all man kind: Provided: That the liberty 
of conscience o•o shall not o~• excuse acts of licentiousness, or 
justif~ practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of this 
Stateo 8 
The New Hampshire Constitution of January, 1776, the first Constitution 
framed by an American Commonwealth, was a very short document 9 apparently in-
tended to be temporary,69 which makes no mention of religiono After several 
attempts to draft an acceptable document, a ratifying convention finally ac-
cepted in 1784 a Constitution which included a Bill of Rights.70 Article IV 
reads: 
Among the natural rights, some are in their very nature un-
alienable, because no equivalent can be given or received for 
them. Of this kind are the RIGHTS OP CONSCIENCE.71 
Article V gives every person the right to worship God according to the dictates 
60Ibid,., pe3257o 64Ib"d __J,_o 9 po325L 68Ibido, po3264o 
61Ibidc 9 p.3249. 65Ibid., p.32580 
69Ibido, IV, 24510 
62Ibid., po3250. 66Ibid., p .. 3259. ?Oibido 9 p.2454. 
63Ibido, p.,3253. 67Ibid~, Po3261. 71Ibid. 
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of his own conscience, provided he does not disturb the peace nor others in 
their worship,72 and further "that every denomination of Christians" shall be 
equally under the protection of the law, "and no subordination of any one sect 
or denomination to another shall ever be established by lawo ..... 73 The next 
section aclmowledges that "morality and piety" are the best security for govern-
ment and therefore empowers the legislature to authorize the towns to make pro-
vision, at their otm expense, for the support and maintenance of public 
Protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality. The towns are to have 
the right of selecting their own teachPrs and no one is required to support a 
teacher other than of his own denomination.74 Only Protestants shall be eligi-
ble to hold office,75 and the oath of office is taken, "so help me God."76 
However, i.f a person be "scrupulous of swearing," - a concession to the Quakers -
he may omit the words ttso help me God'1 and subjoin instead, .. This I do under the 
pains and penalties of Perjury.1177 
The good people of Massachusetts were the most cautious of all the 
Americans in the granting of religious liberties~ The Preamble ;o their 1780 
Constitution pays tribute to the great "legislator of the Universe 1 11 and recites 
in lofty tenns a Declaration of Rights: 
It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society public-
ally and at stated seasons, to worship the SUPREME BEING, the 
great Creator and Preserver of the Universe •••• 78 
and further, that no subject shall be hurt, molested, 
oo• for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to 
the dictates of his own conscience ooo provided he does not disturb 
the peace ••• 79 
72Ibid. 75Ibid., po2462. 78Ibid., III, 1889. 
73Ibid. 76Ibid., po2468o 79Ibido 
74Ibid. 77Ibid. 
14 
There are no religious qualifications for voting;SO but an office holder must 
profess to the Christian re11·~1·on- 81 • · · d · Q k h 
_ - ~ . ~ concession is ma e to ua ers w o may 
"affirm" rather than swear to an oath.82 
The people of Massachusetts are also convinced that the "preservation of 
Civil government depends on piety, religion and morality, ,,S3 and to that end 
"the people have a right to invest the legislature'' with the power to authorize 
and.require the towns to make suitable provision "for the support and Mainten-
ance of public Protestant teachers of piety, religion and mora1 i ty in an cases 
where such provision shall not be made volun tar.Hy. 84 1\ lthough the towns and 
parishes do have the right to ~elect teachers and money paid for public worship 
was to be applied to the sect of their own choosing, public morality was not 
left <;o cha.nee - the legislature was empowered to enjoin attendance ,. 85 On the 
other hand, 
• ", every rltmomination of Christians , •• shall be equally under 
the protection of the law and no subordination of any one sect 
over another shall ever be established by law,,86 
In summarizing the situation that existed in the individual states from 
the ~eclaration of Independence to the first session of the Congress under the 
new Constitution, two things must be kept in mind, Fir~t. there are three 
aspects to complete religious freedom: one, the right to worship (or not to 
worship) in accordance with one's individual beliefs - that is, freedom of 
conscience or toleration; two. the disestablishment of a state church; three, 
the removal of any civil disabilities stemming from belief or disbelief in any 
particular faith. Second, these Constitutions do not necessarily reflect con-
.ditions as they ac:tually existed, but rather represent what the people felt 
80
rbid., p.1e95,, 
81Ibid., p.1900. 
82Ibid. 
83IbJQ.. ~ pnl889, 
84ll?id. 
85Ibid. 
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"ought to be"; these constitutional provisions represented in many instances an 
idealo 
All states (with the exception of Maryland which restricted toleration to 
Christians) recognized that freedom of conscience was the natural right of all 
men. There was tolerance of differences and a definite recognition of the 
rights of minorities" Numerous clauses permitted one to "affirm" rather than 
"swearrt in taking an oath~ and excused from military service those whose re-
ligion did not permit them to bear arms. In many of these documents there are 
specific statements that no man shall be compelled to support any church. 
By the end of the "critical years, 1' of the eleven states which had passed 
fundamental laws~ only Massachusetts and New Hampshire restricted equal protec-
tion of the law to Christian sects and specifically reqnir<rd rublic support of 
the Christian religion. Delaware, New Jersey, North Carolina and Pennsylvania 
had specific ••no establishment" clauses (and Virginia had passed the Statute of 
Religious Liberty), and the other states were either silent on the subject of 
establishment or included a "no pref e:r""n~e clause" in their freedom of con-
science clause. By the end of this period there were no religious qualifica-
. 
tions for voting in any of the Constitutionso Almost all, however, specified 
that office holders have a belief in a Deity or be Christians or, in the case 
of New Hampsliire, Protestants; they were not convinced that non-Christians 
were "good" people. The people of the new nation wanted their leaders to be 
religious, but they were afraid of too close an association with the clergy of 
any specific denomination. The traditional American anti-clericism is evi-
denced at this time by emphatic prohibitions in four out of the eleven Con-
stitutions agai.nst clergymen holding offices of public trust; they wanted to 
keep the church out of government and government out of the church. 
Americans had come a long way in the post-Revolu~ionary years - from 
16 
persecution to tolerance. from established church to equality for nll church~s; 
nor was it only the States which expressed these changes ~Lr: their legal Jocu-
ments. Such ideas were embodied in the fundamental documents of the new nation 
~<; well. 
Chapter II 
THE NEW NATION 
With the Declaration of Independence in July of 1776, the thirteen col-
onies took their first united step towards becoming a free, independent nation. 
The members of the Philadelphia Congress, referring to the "laws of nature, and 
nature's God," held it to be self-evident that "all rnen are created equal," 
that ~rthey are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, 0 and 
that among these rights are "life, libet>ty, and the Ptlrsuit of happiness." 
There are several references to the Deity9 including an appeal to the "Supreme 
Judge of the world," and an affirmation of reliance on the "protection of 
Divine Providence," but no specific reference to religion. The Articles of 
Confederation and Perpetual Union, formally adopted by Congress on November 15, 
1777, assert that the severB.l states enter into a "firm league of Friendship" 
for their common defense, the security of their liberties and their 
mutual and general welfare; binding themselves to assist each other 
against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them or.any of 
them on account of religion ee• or any pretense whatevere lEmphasis 
supplied)! 
This is the first document of nation-wide scope which mentions religion. This 
time the Deity is referred to as the 11Great Governor" of the world. 2 
The principles that were foreshadowed, though not fully articulated, in 
1Jonathan Elliott (ed.), Debates .Q!.~ State Conventions .Q.!l~ Federal 
Constitution (Washington, DoC., 1836), I, 108. hereinafter referred to as 
Elliott. 
2Ibid., p .. 113., 
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the Declaration of Independence were given their first national expression ten 
years later. At the very time that the Constitutional Convention was meeting, 
the Congress of the Confederation passed the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which 
establishe1 the policy for governing that territory and for the future expansion 
of the United States. Even more important~ it guaranteed to the future inhab-
itants of the territory a fi1ll bill of rights embodying 
o .. the fundamental princ'Lples of civil and religious lib~rty, which 
form the basis whereon these republics, their laws and constitutions 
are erected; to fix and establish these principles as the basis of 
all laws, constitutions and governments which forever hereafter shall 
be formerl. •003 
Its first Article provided that "no person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and 
orderly manner shall ever be molested on account of his m~ce of worship or reli-
gious sentiments, in the se.id territory," ~. precedent of national concern for 
religious freedom was established; for the first time in history free men volun-
tarily secured not for themselves but for others the "inalienable rights of man." 
The Constitution of the United States contains only one mention of reli-
gion~ the last clause of Article VI: "o•o but no religious test shall ever be 
required as qualification to any office or public trust under the United 
States." Th~ subject of religion was not at issue. The first mention of reli-
gion noted in the official Journal of the Convention4 was not until August 30, 
more than three months after the delegates began their deliberations. Madison's 
notes, however, 5 indicate that Charles Pinckney submitted a Plan of a Federal 
3 Thorpo, II1 9570 
4Elliot, I, 306,, 
5Henry D. -Gilpin (ed.),~ Madison Papers: His Reports .Qf. the ~tes 
_in~.!~e;:_al Convention (Washington, DoCo~_ l,a?lp'tree and O'Sullivan, 1840), 
II~, 7 4L .. (This .will hereafter b.e ci tad as. Madison Papers.) See also Max 
Farrand (edo), _Records .Q!!!llt .. Feder& Convention . .Q! 1787 (New tiaven: Yale 
University Press, 1911; Vol. IV, 1937), IV, 28. hereinafter referred to as 
Farrand. 
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r.on~ti.tuticri on May 28~ rnn. Thi.A planp whic!1 WM quite dehlilcd~ focl~Jd(-'ct ·~ 
provi1don th!~t ''Tho le1dtJlntur1~ of the Onited fitateo sh.<tll pllH'l nn Jaw on tho 
6 
sub,ject of religion~" and ca.lled for 
'I1he Pri.wention of Religious Tests as qunUfica.tions of Offlces of 
t:ru.st or Emolument ••• the last a pr;oovi.sion of the world will 
expect from you, in tho establishment of a System founded on 
Hepubli.can 'Principlcm~ a.nd in an age i10 libeX'l'.l.l and enlightened 
ai:.1 the present, 7 
Mr. i:1lncknay added~ 
our true oituation 1.:mema to be thisp - a n{"w mctenoivo country con-
ttdning idthin it.self., th~ mat,~rial::i of form.ir.g a govornment capable 
of t•X temiing to itfJ cl t:iiens all the oloirningr~ of' civil and Fteligioua 
l:iberly.8 
Th~re in no .record of nny debate on Hro :,''inckney 11 n 1:len. 
~.'hr, mixt mention of relig:i.on was on Auguot 20~ whc-n ~>d.ioon notes that 
D~t;ail, "sundry propoaitions 19 concerning the poworo of Uw legfalature~ in-
eluding the foll.owing~ 
l~o religious teat or qualification shall evor bl' nnnoxcd to e.ny 
oath of of':f'ica under the authodty of the United States. 
Thi.a was part of a Hat which included other personal liberties w habeas corpun, 
lfb{~rt:r of the press~ subordination of the military to civilian authorityw etci, 9 
6r1~<!J:!i.2.U .P..aP..tr.~h r~. 720. 
7 Farrand, III. l.22, The on tire plan is quotet~ in Farrand, Illy 106ff ~ 
'J;'he editor notes that this pa.rt was evidontly ad.d.cd later since it is not 
in keeping wHh the rest of the plan. M11dloo.n fltati;s :tn his noten that 
beceusa of tho length of the paper .submitted by Mr~ Pinckney, he did not 
take notes, F-nd that the oopy which is inserted in his notes wna ta.ken from 
papers f'urnished to the Secre·tary of State and published in 1819. Madison 
.~:!!• III, Appendix vi. 
8y•11r.rand, lV, 28, · '11hiB 1.s from Mr. Pinc.1rney' a vers'ion of his own 
opeach whi.oh i.s in.oludecl in the 1837 addit:i on to Mr. Farrand n s work. TJn1PS£1 
more contemporary i•eporte ar.e 1H scovered~ it itt unlikely that we will ever 
know how accurate thase reports are. 
9!IB9 taon. iJ!P2r:!• I Il ~ l :;66; Pa rrand » II t 342 n 
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This was referred to that committee without debateo10 On August 30th 
Article 20 l-tas taken up (now Artic1 e VI dealing with the oath of officr )o 
Mr. Pinckney moved to add to the Articles: "But no reli~ious test shall ever 
be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the nuthor-
i ty of the United States."11 Mro Sherman of Connecticut thought it unnecessary, 
11 tr.e prevaiUng liberelity being sufficien't secur:ity ageinst such tests,1112 
Mro Gouvernur Horris and General Pinckney seconded the motion, 13 and it was 
pas~ed unanimousl~r •14 The wr.ole article was then apnroved with North Carolina 
voting "No," and rriaryland dividedo 15 All states W·erP present that day except 
16 New York and, of course, Rhode Island. 
The Committee of 0tyle reported on that clause on Sepkmber 12th~ elimina-
ting the words 0un~.er t!i.e authority of, 1117 and on S-:>ptember 17, 1787, the fin'l1 
draft showed no further change. 18 
Religion, as such, was not mentioned again" There was, however. a brief 
diGcussion on the inclusion of a Bill of Rightso On SeptembPr 12th, ?fr. El-
bridge Gerry of Massachusetts urged the n·:cessi ty of jury trials to guard 
against corrupt judges.19 ::clonel Mason perceived the difficulty and 
--------~~~--~v-.......--
11Nad_i_~ Pa.J22.!:~• III, 1468: fa-r .. ·amlt II. 468; r:lliot, I, _::Y,. 
12Ib~. 
17. :.>r-raa is on Papers III., 1468; Farrand, II, 4,:;fl. 
14E11iot. I, 3or:. 
15 ~~ ?ape:r~, III, 1468; F'fl.r'.'.'and, II, 468. 
16~lliot 1 I, 306. 
17Madison ?"ners, III, 1543; Farr3.nd, II, 579. 603~ 
18Hudi'.':._O.!l.I:s:1.~rs, III~ 1622; r'arrand., II~ 663. 
19r.Iadi'3on Papers, III 9 1565 • 
wished the plan ha<l been prefaced with ~: bill of Rights and would 
secor.d a rr.otion if made for that purpose. It would eive great 
atdet to the people; .:1nd with the aid of the :ltates Declarations 
a Bill might be prepa:red in a few hours.20 
Gerry commrred in the idea and moved for a Cammi ttee to prepare 11 Bill of 
21 
Eieht:=i; the motion was seconded by Colonel Mason. The only recorded debate 
on this motion consists of a statement by Mr. Sherman that he "was for secur-
ing the rights of the people where requisite, 0 but that "the State Declara-
tions of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution, and being in force arc 
sufficient." Mas::m answered that the laws of the United States are paramO'l:.nt 
to ~tate Bills of Rights. 21 The official Journal of the Convention indicates 
that this was defeated unanimously, 10 no, 0 aye. 22 However, Madison's notes 
indicate 5 in fav•Jr - New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 11nd 
Delaware - and 5 against - Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Rnd Georgia, ~!J.t'ri ~'l«!Ssachusetts listed as absent. 23 (Since at least one de le-
f,'ate from Massachusetts was present, one wonders if Marii~'ln didr.'t mean "ab-
stain" instead of R.bsent.) The North-South division in the voting brings to 
mind the statement of General Pin~kney in the South Carolir..a Convention. Tt 
is nlso interesting to note that the three men who did not sign the Constitu-
t:i.cn, 1'11.son, Gerry, a11d Ra.ndoJ:oh, were proponents of e Bill of R:\.ght.s from 
:;tates which did n<'t sup})ort a Bill of Rights. 
On September 14 Mr. Ha.dison and Mr. Pinckney moved to include in the 
powers of Congress the power to establish a university in which "no preferenc~ 
or Mstinction should ho allowed on account of religion. 1124 l; ,'. {/il sori 
-----M-----·---·------
201.!?.11.• 
21Jhid. 
22r.1Eot, I, 336; Farrard, n, 582. 
23Mi:i.dison P'.'l.per~. III, J 565 • 
24Farrand 9 II, 616; Ii_a~ f.a net>s, II , 7 40' 
22 
supported the motion but Mro Morris felt such a power was not necessary be-
cause of Congress~s exclusive power at the Seat of Governmento The motion was 
defeated 6 to 4 with one dividedo 25 There was no further discussion concerning 
religion, and the completed Constitution containing only one reference to reli-
gion was submitted by Congress for transmittal to the States. 
A letter from James Madison to George WashingtQn, dated September 30, 
1787,26 indicates that Richard Henry Lee proposed the addition of a Bill of 
Rights to the Constitution before it should go forth from the Convention to 
Congress. In this action he was supported by f.~ela.ncthon Smith. The Bill of 
Rights was to contain provisions for 11 trial by juries in civil cases, and 
several other things corresponding with the ideas of Colonel Mason."27 (Pre-
sumably, this would have included provisions concerning religious liberty.) 
It was contended that the Confederation Congress had an undoubted right to in-
sert amendments, and that "it was their duty to make use of it in a case where 
the. essential guards of liberty had been omittedo" The principal argument 
against the addition of a Bill of Rights at this point was that any action of 
the Congress would have to be addressed to the legislatures of the various 
states and not to the conventions, and that, therefore, being addressed to 
the legislatures under the Articles would require unanimous consent. The 
matter was therefore dropped. 
There was considerable unanimity of opinion at the Constitutional Conven-
tion that the Federal government as a_goverrunent of delegated powers had no 
authority in the matter of reli~ious li.berty, that this was a concern of the 
25Farrand, II, 616; Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, aye; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, 
Georgia, no; Connecticut, dividedo 
26Madison Papers, II, 643-45. 
27Ibid. 
ste.tes. The Confederation government did have au'"hority over the goverrmnrt 
of territories and anticipated the action of th~ state ratifying canvP.ntior..s 
by providing a full Bill of Rights for the No~thwest Territory patterned on 
the various state Billso It is logical to assume thrt the Confederation ~on­
gress was gra"lting t:o future states those same "inalienable rightfl o:" man" 
which were already recoenized by the existing states. 
fls was pointed out previously, the hst step to complete religious fr~e­
dom is the removal o" civil <lisabilities because of rPligious beliefs< That 
no ''religious test shall be required" by the Constitution \-tas accepted with-
out debate, almost as a matter of courseo 
Chapter I!I 
WE THP PEOPLE 
The Federal Constitution as submitted to the states contained only one 
clause pertaining to religion .. itno religious test shall bo required to hold 
an office of trust under the United States, 11 There was conc()rn in the state 
conventions because there was no Bill of Rights to protect newly won freedoms, 
among them, the freedom of conscience. One gets the impression that the reli-
gious problem had already been settled on the state levrl, and that in the dis-
oussions of the Rights of Man, freedom of religion waa added almost as an 
, afterthought. The convention delegates were far more conco-rned with the tra· 
di tionnl "rights of Englishmen," the "legnl" safegiiards such as trial be ,jury. 
right of habeas corpus, proteot:J..on again'3t unraaaonable searches and sei~mree t 
etc.1 · 
The record.a of the ratifying conventions s.ppear far from complete; yet it 
is clear from those we have that debates regarding any aspect of religious 
freedom occupied a very sm9.ll portion of the time spent in dioouosing the 
Constitution. The Delaware Convention, which ratified first and unanimously, 
left neither a record of its debates nor any suggestions for amend.ments.2 
------.......................... _,  _... ___ _ 
1 Jackson Turner Main, in his .An~.1-Federali eta 1 . Cr1 tics .9.t the Constitµti2n 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961 , confirms this view. 
"Generally ratification conventions that drafted Bills of Rights included re-
ligious freedom as a matter of course, but other amendments seemed far more 
important." Religious freedom "was least mentioned apparently because there 
was nothing in the Constitution that threatened it and no special safeguards 
were deemed necessary," PP• 158-59. 
2re111ot, I, 349. 
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Georgia, less thnn a n.onth later, also ratified unanimo'-lsly 1 and without quali-
f . t" 3 N .J ica :.'.0'1, ew ersey / too, accepted the Constitution without qw:1lificl'-tion, 
.1 leaving no rP.cord cf any d'3bates which may hav9 taken placeo Rhode Island, 
the laPt sta-!:e to ratify the Constituti0n, si1111arly lert ~o record of its de-
bates but J.eft no dcubt as to its position in regard to religion. Among the 
a".llendments prop0serl by Hhode Islanc \-'as on~ the.t provided that a perf'o·~ reli-
giously scrupulous of bearing anns ought t0 be exempt uron the paymerit of an 
equiwlent5 and 
IV. Tb.at :.-eJigion, o:r the du7.y which we 011<'e to our r.reator, a:-i.d 
the manner of discharging it, can be directed only be reason and 
conviction, and not ·by 1-:0.r-ce and violence, and therefore, all men 
have a natural 9 equal, and unalienable right to the exercise of 
religion, RC~ording to tte dictates of cons~iP.nce, and that 10 
particular re:!.ig:l ou'1 sect or sori.C,ty 0ught to be favored or 
establi~hed, by law, in prefe~ence to others-6 
The only speech preserved from thf' Tllew Hampshire convention dealt e··_clusively 
with the slrwe.ry questi0n The NN• Hampshire convention did 1-i.0w8ve:r s:1l:mi t 
several amendr:ients, including 
XI. Congress shall rn9ke no laws toucring religion or to iYJ.fringe 
th . f' ' 7 e rights o .. ccn8ci.ence. 
The records of +.he ?faryl<ln:J C'Onwmtton lll''e not cleare A comrdttee l"f tbe 
conve:::ition wa::. e.ppointed to pre::are a liGt of a'-!erH.lmcnt~ to the :.or.sti tution,.. 
".'hat com'!littee apparently fee.red that state Bills of 1Ughts and Cons ti ~uti.cns 
might be repealed by CongreGSo They submitted twelve amend.me-its tn the co'1ven-
tion for consideration, the first that Congres3 shall have no power other tban 
that expressly delegated to it.8 An amendment "thl'.t therf' shall be no national 
reli~ion established by l~w; but that all pe~sons be equally entitled to protec-
ti.cm in their religious liberty" was subnii tted to ':he committee but re,iected by 
3Tb•d LL•• p.355. 5-"b. l ~.•ti p~370~ 7Tb·a ~!),; p.358. 
4Ibid., 
,- 8 Ibid., p.351. 0 rb· -l TT 509 • 
.:.-!S• ..Jo. ..L ) 
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it. 9 Haryland ratified the Constitution but rejected the arnenrJ.rr.ents proposed 
by its committee.10 They were obviously not influenced by a letter from Luther 
Hartin giving his views on the Const] tution, 11 r•Je.rtin, Attorney G1meral of 
Maryland and delegate to the Conntitutional Convention in Phil,'ldelp:!'li<i~ hRri 
many objections to the Constitution including the lack of a Bill of RiRht~c 
One can't be sure whether the following comment is sincere or sarcastic: 
The part of the system which provides that no relieious test shall 
ever be requirr:-c1 as a qualification to any office or public trust 
under the Unit~d Sb.tes was adopted by a great majority of the 
Co::iventioL, a~d without much de't:ate; however~ th'.)re were snme 
members so unfoshion8.ble as to thrnk that a belief in thP. exis-
t <>"Jr-e of a Deity and. of a state of future rewards Pnd p•m~_s.hm~nts 
would be somA security for the good conduct of our rulers ••• and 
thnt distinctinn between the nrofessors of C~rlstianity and down-
right infidelity or paganism.12 
Connecticut, too, ratified ur;conditionallyo 13 The only mention of reli-
gion in tli.e Connecticut debates is i'1 answer to .11 question regarding the oath. 
'I'he Ikm. Olivsr Wolcott replied as follows: 
T do not see the necessity of such a test:, as some gPntlemon wish for • 
.,. • For myself, I should be content either i-: '.th or without the clause 
in the constitution which excludes test J a111;:;. Knowledge and liberty 
<ire sc prevP.1ent in this countr,r that I do not believe that the United 
States would ever be disponed to estah1i:h one religi0us sect and lay 
all others under Jegal disabHitier;) 4 
, '~ !ie cldecl trnt 1my such test '•l'OUld be: in->urirn:.s to the rigi1t<: oi.' free ci":izcns ;., 
and that it would n0t be "eltogether superiluous to have r,dded a clause which 
secures us fr-:>m the possibilityir of being deprived of those rights. 16 
New Yo:!'.'k su'tmitted proposed a:nendrr.E>nts tc th?. Constitution~ incluilinf,' a 
.<c:tnterr:ent thE'.t 
the !'eopl~ hrwe .'.'n equal, natural :->nd unali.enable ric;ht freely and 
:t)r;.':C·~D b \y to C?J'Y'C"he t11ei r relir~iJn acr:-0rdin'=' tr: t:b~ di-:-ta.tcs of 
9 .... "d LRL 11 • 
10,b"d 
..t.-L.' 
p.512 
J. 381~ 
u.... d r-r 
. :'arran , .. 1 -~ 
419. 
13Ib1' d- 9 -.:49 - !l•./ • 
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com:~ience~ and that no religi.0·1s sc.:::t or scc-iety ought b be 
f:1v0re'l (T est::blinhed l>y law in pi:·?ferencP t;o ot11cr:- ., 
The subject o: religion was not o":he:rwice rr.t:n ti.oncd in the ~ourse of the d~ba tes 
which take almost 200 pages to report? 
In Penn:.>ylvania the burden of defending thc- "onsti tu+1on fP-ll on .Ta.mes 
';l:Uso.:. the only member of the ?hiladelphia convention who wan 1.lso a member of' 
the r11tifying convention, Although the debates in ?ennsyJvania were faidy ex-
tensive, there was only one specific menhon of r&Jigion, The question was 
raised, almo~1t in passing, that there 1·:nn ''no Gecurity fo-:-- :-ignt::::: of con-
science."17 Wilson r£>sponded with another question! "' aak this honorable 
gentleman, what p'.lrt of this syntem puts it in the power of Conr,ress to attack 
those rights? 1•18 The omission of n Bill of :::ightn was questioned several 
t ' 19 1_rnes.} In each casP. the answer was the same; 
A -;?reposition to adoi;t. a men.sure, 'that would have supposed tha1 we 
we:·e tli.rowing intn thr::; genPrnl co.rArnP'rnt, eve."'Y power not expressly 
reserved by the people \Wuld have bee!' ~:n:urned at iri that house • 
. • , In a govern!Ilent of enu!ller=1 ted r:;o·,;ers fi t7 would not only be 
unnecessary but preposterous and d~neerou;.::o 
One can almost feel the ter oers ""j sing xh:::n }.!' ,, ~ti) ::on snys ~ 
If the minor:'. ty f\~0 c~::m•J:m:1u1r_: for t:ht"I :-i;:"'ts of manl'in-l, whnt then 
are the majon ty contending for? ".,. the rr.ajor:. ty must be conternhng 
Al though the Pennsylvanians accepted the Cons ti tu ti or. wi trout appe1:din~ amend-
mn.rts, the delegates apuoi1•e-: ::t cyr,nittee to deliberate and nropose arnendm'1nts 
11 j_n order to remed;v the~e inr:on'·~n) enc'3s and to ['Vert a nprehended <'tanr;er. '1 
That co'I!Ill5.ttee's recommerdetions included nro".risions regardtng the poll tax. 
standing armies, selection of 2enator:,; and that ''every reserve of the rights of 
individuals~ made by the several constitutions of 1·r·<:1 states in th1: union 
shall rem'3.in inviolable~ except insofar as they are expressly O•• yielded "22 ••o 
17~'b·n 
.!.....!...;. • , p.425 • 19T 'd "bJ ~ 0 ';) ppo408g 426, 49L 21 Ibido, pQL'60 .. 
18-h.a 2-.....L.• ?Oib'cl , _ _Lor p.4080 22TM~~~' Pe50~., 
?8 
Re1j gion is rot srecific~lly mentioned, There 1s ocvfou91y a general recogni-
ti on of the ''rights of mann = the oniy prl"lbJ e'TI ··m:· to h.,ep the central gC'vern-
ment from inte:rfering• 
In 1fansachusetts. es migh~ l::e exy,-ected f!'O!Tl a :-~ndJnf: of her constitutjon, 
there 1-mre several delegates who objer:ted to the "no rC>ligious test'' clause of 
the r:onsti tuti0n, TJ.ic most able r3efenders of thn t C'~ c,u~e wer~ mf':n'hers of the 
clergy. r.:'h~ Hon, Hr. r5foeletry thought that mr:n in nowcr :::iho1~ld have some re-
ligion, preferably Christian. "yet by the Cons ti tut:l on a ~:a pint or an infidel 
''? 
were as eligible as they."<-· ~)e.veral other" urged thnt the c1ause was a "de-
partur<;> frorri the P''.nciples of 0ur forefather;": who Cll'T,e fey- the prAD0rvaU.on 
f , < • ,,2t1~ o re ,ig~.on. · 
the Con~titution W?~; tl-e ab;ocnce of a religious b~;L :;e ''thought that a per-
rn- . .,...,· '""' ~ n25 ~10n could not. bfJ a good man ;,;i thout being a good dL. 1:-. tian. 'l'his w:w the 
strongest statement on thi~3 subject m.'.lde in any of the convenUon:::::. ''.'he2e ob-
jection.s were very ably '}:1swere:~, 'J'hs ::ev" ·:r, ';hutc eave a long dissertation 
on the merits of the clau:;e and the merits of all relit;ion!J, and concluded by 
saying, 
There are worthy men in 1111 denominrttions - , •. evPn 11mon.c; those who 
:inve no other guide in the >my of v:Lrtm) awl heaven th::m th2 6ictates 
of nabral re1ig;on"26 
and that the inc1union of such a test would be of no advantRge since the un-
scrupulous would not hesitate to take the oath, only the honest uo11lc be ex-
eluded. "'l'he exclusion of religious t~st in the proposed conn ti tuttcn the re-
f 1 1 t . t be ,.·n fa"OT" -" ,._, .• ~ ;.in n 27 ore appears c ear y, o me~ sir,, o • ~ o _ 1 ... , ,H~opc,..o ... 'Ihi:? 
Env, iYlr. ?ayson of Suffolk County added that a relicionf; test would be a 
"blemif:'h on the instrument" fo,._. ''God alone is the G::.d of tha conscienct.~," a--:d 
2
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attempts to "erect hunum tribunals for the conscient>es of men are irr.pious en-
croachm.mts upon the prerogn.ti ves of Godo' 28 fhortly before U·,e convention was 
to adjourn? the Hev .. Mr. Backus asked leave to give his thoughts on the exclu-
sion of a religious test. His defense of this clause was most thoughtful and 
well-reasoned. 
I.:any appear to be concerned about it; but nothing is more evir1.er.t 
both in reason, and in the holy scriptures~ than th11t religion is 
ever a matter between God and individuals; and ther~fore, no man or 
men can impose any religious test without invaciing the essential 
prerogatives of our Lord Jesus Christ ••• o t,nd let the history of 
all nations be searched from that day to this, and it will appear 
that the imposing of religious test:J hath .been the greatest engine 
of tyranr.y in the world., And l rejoicri to see >o many gentlemen, 
who are now giving fo their rights of conscience, in thiis great 
and important matter. Some serious minds discover a concr~n lest, 
if all religious tests should be excluded, the Congress wc·1Jld hnre-
after establish Papery or son:.e other ty.rnnnica.l way of war.ship. But 
it is most certain, that no such way of worshir; cE,.n b·:: est .'lblL:ihed 
wi thO'l t any relig: ous test. c9 
'l'·he people of Massachusetts, ''acknowledging with grateful hea"'ts, the goodness 
of tho Supreme Ruler of the Uni•rerse, "3o ratified the Condi tut ion wi.'thout 
further mention of religion. 'J'hey submitted severa] amendments includinr; 
amounts involved in jury t".'ials, taxation; representation, rese,..vations of 
powers, b + . ) . , . . 31 u , none invo .ving re ... igion. 
In the South Carolina legislature, which unanimously agreed to call a 
convention to consider the Constitution, a Mr. L~.ncoln inquired~ ''Why was th:is 
~onstitution not ushered in with the bill of rights'"' "Are the people to have 
no rights?1'32 General Charles Coatsworth Pinckney gave the familiar answer th,,!; 
in a government of delegated powers it would not be necessa7, then submitted 
an additional reason for not including a Bill of Rights - the reason, no doubt, 
that South Carolina did not support the motion for a Bill of Rights in the 
Constitutional Convention. 
28
,Jbid. ~ p.128. 
29Ibid,f p.156. 
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ti.nother reason weighed heavily with men of tMs ;.>hter such bilJs 
usually begin wHh a declaration that all men e<.re hy r ature free, 
now we should malt:e that decl9.ration with 11 very bF.,d gra::'e, 11hen 
a large part of our property consists in men who are actually 
born slaves • .53 
The debates in South Carolina were -:"lot narticull=trly utimulating: religion was 
mentioned only twice, once in passing, 54 and once when filro Charlos Pinckney, in 
what appears to be an attflmpt i:o forestalJ arguments 9 embarked o~ a discussion 
of -political theory. Referring to England he said, 
even the government I have alluded to" withholds,, from a part of 
its subjects, the equal enjoyment of their rel j gi ous li be rtien ... 
Fow many thousands of the suh,v•f!ts of <;reat Bri ta:i.n, at this momPnt. 
Jabor under ciY:U disabiliti~n, merely on ac-.::ount of' their" religious 
p9rsuasions ! 'I'o the liberal and enliehtened mind; the rest of F~urope 
affords a melan0holy picture of the dep:riivity o:' human nature, and of 
th9 tobl subver~.i on of those rights 9 without which W(" should suppose 
no people should. be haopy ')r content.35 
Despite iVIr. ?inckney 1' s di~1cussion 9 the :~outh Car-olinians iqrnended several 
resolutions to their ra+.ifj cation, including one \;htc~l ~;tated that the third 
section of the sixth Articlg ought. to be amended by insert: mg the word ''other'' 
between the words ''no'' and "religion," making that section read, ''no other 
religiom~ test shall ever be required ar' riu~lification to any c;Cfice or publi~ 
trust 1mdor the constitutiono 1• 36 The ·~outh Carolinians would have pref.Jrred 
to apply their own religions tccii to ~'ederal as well as state offi cos - the 
only state to so indicate. 77 (It is interesting to note that only two yeGrs 
later their ;)tate Constitu":ion eliminated religious qualifir:ati0n for hcldine 
office.) 
--------~--.--.----
33,rb • .l 
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37rn The Elli of~!!.§. and lJ:lf!! It Ii:eans Today,(Norman: Uo of Okla .. 
Press, 1957), p.20~ ~·:award Dumbauld states "'This refinement of logic would 
have recognized the taking of the oath as a religious test rather than as 
a mere solemnity imposing an obligation under public law.,. Fe refers t0 
this as "meticulous reasoning'' on the part of the delegates. overlooking 
the fact t11at South Carolina already required a religious test. 
31 
One of the major objections of the Virginia delegates was the absence of a 
B'll f R" ht Th" th t d · d · 3B 1 o ng So · is eme wa"3 repea e· again an again, P1.J.trick P:enry con-
ducted a one-man filibuster in propo~ing the addition of a Pill of Rights. In 
his usual dramatic style he stated "it is radical in this trc-.nsi ti on, o·rr 
rights and privileges are endangeredo eoo The rights of conscience, trial by 
. l "b t f th d d . ,.., . o39 Jury, 1 er y o e press ,, • , are re.,.. E>re 1n .. ecure, o , • His mention of 
religion was always as one of several rights which needed to be protected. He 
ap,P'3ared far more concerned with the many ''legal and p1'.'ocedural" safeguards. 
Preedom of religion under the Constitution was ably and eloquently defended by 
Randolph. by Madisonv by 1nnes,. and by a !'1r0 Zachariah Johnson. Edmund Handolph 
said that he previously objr;cted to the Cons+;itution,. but that he was convinced 
that since no religious test was reauired ~ no express ~;o;-1er over relie:i on was 
given to the Federal Government; therefore~ afl a government of enumerated powers, 
it could not interfere in that areao40 
l<'urther, 
The variety of sects which abound i~ the United States is the 
best security for freedom of religion. No part of the consti-
tution even if strictly construed!, will justify a conclu~jon. 
thi:i. t the general !$Overnmer ". can take a'rmy or impai ".' the free· 
iom of religion.4.l 
Mr. ?:achariah Johnson of Augusta County, i'1 an exceller.t defense of the whole 
Constitution, pointed out that the vastness of the country, the ii··ersity of 
opinion and varfoty of sects :in the United States wo1.Jld make it difficult to 
establish a re~.igion, and that anyonP, who attempted to do so would be i•univer-
11 d t t d d d d 'l f ~ t d "42 sa y e .es e an oppose an easi y rus•ra e • ~fadiMn, too, in his able 
fashion defended thP. Constitution on this mattero 43 fut it wa~ left to Mr. Innes 
to call attention to the contradictory argume'1ts of the anu-~·euerahsts on the 
38Tho~~~ II!, 72~ 162, 47~ . .}.L 9 4119 311. 40rh d 
.::..:L• v p. 0 07, 
42I11"d . __ 1,... ) p.581. 
39Ibid. ·' p.72o 41.Ibid" 9 p.431. 43n10_., lTI, 313,. 
r-atte:r of religion. 
Can it be mtid that liberty of corwcience 1s in dan~r? I obse"."ve 
on the side of the Constitution~ those who have been champions of 
religious liberty, an attack on which 1 would as soon resist~ as 
one on civil liberty, Do they employ consistent arguments to show 
it ic in danger? They inform you that Tu.,.ks, Jews, Infidels~ 
Christians, and all other sects, may be presiden~s and command 
the fleet and army. there being no test requiredo And yet the 
tyrannical and inquisitorial Congress will ask me as a private 
citizen, what is my opinion on religion, and punish me if it does 
not conform to theirs. I cannot think tbe gentleman could be 
serious when he made these repugnP.nt and incompatible objoctions,44 
'fl-1e main debates in Vi -rginfa centered around the question of whether or not 
r11tification should be made conditional on t:t:e qcceptance of certajn amend-
ments" or whether the Constitution should be ratified and amendments recnm-
3? 
men)Pd. The proponents of unc".>nditional ratif:'..C"ation won out iri Virginia, 11.nd 
'1 committee was appointed to submit recommendations fcir amendrr:ents. 45 That 
c;ommi ttec' s rAport, whicr was arbpted hy the ~or>vention, 46 inclurled th!' Virginia 
T;eclarRtion of Rights, a Bill of Rir:htf~ with twenty provisions and twenty addi-
tional amP.ndments to the Con~titutio1 itself. 47 'fhe ''Wh~reas'' clause of that 
i:-eport made it quite clear that the po~.,ers gr~nted undAr the proposed Gonstitu-
ti.on were the gift of the neo:ole, and. that e~rnry uower not t;ranted remained with 
the people; 
therefore no right of any denomination can be cancelled, abridged, 
restrained or modified~ by the Congress, by the :fonate. or the 
House of Hepresentati·res acting in any capacity, r;y the l'.lresidert 
or any department, Ot' offi0ffr of the Uni tf'd States. e::<cept i.n 
those instances on which pow'3r i8 give11 by the constitutio11 for 
those purposes; and that a:nong o~her esP-ential ,..ir;hts., the lib-
erty of conscience, And of the press cann0t b8 can0ellP.d , •• by 
any authority of the United States.48 
44Ibidw, p.573. The gentleman referred to is PatriC1{ H~nry and is a:; 
obvious reference to the fact that the proponentfl of the Constitution were 
also proponents in thn struggle to pass the Virginia 3tatute of Religfous 
J,iberty, which Henry opposed. 
45Ibid." p.587. 
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·;·here was / ho~·1ever, no f"pecific clause in the cody of amendr;:ents concerning 
religions freedom. The debates in Vi rgu1rn are considered by historians "•.rd 
scholars to be the most complete ~md thorough of ~hose in any state; a whole 
volt'.Ine of f]lliot." s i·3 required to t'ecord the proceedings" Yet the s11b,jrct of 
re] i{:"ion wr:>.s debated only briefly on three different o~casions.. It ~-TP.S ob-
viously not ~ major issue. 
In North Carolina. on the other· hanc 9 U:ere 1·:as a more thorough and some-
times fantastic diSCiASSion of the 2u.1:jec t of religion.. The Cons ti tu tion was 
considered clause by claus2., ;·;hen \;he la'c e;ls.n:::e of J-r~ .. icle 6 waG introduced, 
Er, Henry Abbot summed U!' ~he q1..<e:•t:.or.;} 1!1 the mind.J or tte delegctes. 49 "some 
are concerned that they wo, .... H be deprived o::..~ w')rshippine God according to their 
consciences'' ar.d wished to knol-; if the "general gover:w:cnt can make laws in-
ro 
fringing on their religious libe!:ties :·::: Others fearG>d thut under the t-reaty-
;;:i· 
makine power Roman Catholicism cou}d be adopted;"~ Sti..11 others wnr.ted to know 
which religion would b~ establi~'hed ('fr. •".bbot says that r~ himself is agai'1st 
• h f' I' T d f t 1" "' ' 1 11 ) 52 exclusive establis men t, bu':". L tr.ere were any, · 1. woul. nrn i: !' ne .w p::. scopa~ . 
And the major objectior: s"?e::r.ed to be that the eYc1us1on of '.-;;:::sts :12.s 'n:poli +:ic 
•• • • . f~ . 53 
and dangerous - ''p'.3.ga:'1s., deists <lrn'. Tfohmr.etans · mignt obtri: n o~ fJ.c:e; 
, 54 H Mr. Abbot also wontlered whn.t form of oath wo1tld be useo.. ;-; con-:::J.udedj "We 
oug'1t to be suspicious of our libertie~. We have felt the effects of oppres-
sive meA.sures, and know the happy consequence of bejnr; ,jealou,; of our ri.f"hts. 
Could I cor..ceive that such objections are well founded, I would decli:i.re my 
opinio!l against .. '' It is difficult, it n0t irr:possible. to evaluate the writte,... 
word 200 years after the fact; however, there· is a naivete >b1ut :.rr. Abbot's 
speech which leads one to believe that he 'VlaS sincerely seeking explanati0ns. 
49Ibid _., IV, 1°5, 5l~b'rl L~.· 53Ibid8 
50
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34 
that he really wanted to knou what effect this new Constitution would have on 
religious liberties~ 
Governor Johnson expresse~ astonis~ment th~t the people were alar~ed on the 
subject of religio"'l. "This m•,ist have arisen from the great pains which had been 
taken to prejudice men's minds aeainf~ the constitution."55 ~r. James Iredell 
(who :i.s Jatr.1'.' appointed to the Supreme Cou!'t) answet'ed Ifr. Abbot, point by 
point. ''I consider thiE' c~.ause under consideration as O!'e of the stron~nt 
proof3 that ::.t wafl the intention of those who f'ormeil the systcw, to establish 
a general religi.ous lil::e:nty in Amer~.ca~'' He caller '3.+.tention to England where 
an 0.'1th is required fo'.".' holding office which he said ''delrrndes and profanes 
the rite."56 "7.s ther'3 any power given to ':ongreS'.s in matt.rrs of r~ligion?"57 
He answerea his own question and wert 011 to say, ••r'lppily; no sect is superior 
to t?.nother" and that as long as thi.s is the case~ we shall be free from tYio::>P. 
persecution~ and distraction v•i.th which oi:her countries have been ~orn.58 As 
for the contention thRt our repre~entati·res would have no religi.oni he as1<:ed, 
••rs it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away tha'.; principle 
of religious freedom which we ourselves so warrrly content for? .... It would be 
happy for mankind if religion was permitted to b.ke l.ts ovm course 1 and ma.in-
i:;-9 
tain itself by the excellence of its mm uoctrines, H .J 
Kc. Iredell told the assembled delegates that he came across a pamphlet 
contending that the Pope in R.o!ne could be elected ::?resident. One can almost 
hear the scorn ir. his voice whon he reminds his hearers thRt under the Consti-
tt,_tior. +.his would '>e irr.pcss::.blo- - the Tope C':lu1dn 't meet the rP.sidence require-
ments!GO As to the question regarding the fo::-m of the oath - simple enough; 
-------------------·------,-·~-
55Ibid., p.200. 
56Ibid.,. p.196. 
5?Ibi~.t p.197. 
the oath )'rllfould be administered in the form which would b1nd his conscience 
61 
most" and this would be determined by the beliefs of the individual taking 
35 
the oatho62 Governor Johnson picked up the case for the defense of the Consti-
tution and said that there are only two instances in which a non-Christian can 
be elected to office: firstp if the people themselves set aside the Christian 
religion, they w.ill elect one who thinks as they do' and second 9 if a person, 
notwithstanding his religion gets the esteem and confidence of the people by 
hie good conduct and virtueo63 As to the establishment of a religion, he felt 
it would be impossible in thi9 country because of the diversity of sects; to 
illustrate this point he liAted the states and the various religions prevalent 
in each oneo64 
A Mro '":pencer diacussinrr the oath said that a test oath does not exclude 
men of bad character because they would not hesitate to take the oathp "But in 
this case as there is not a religio~.1s test required 9 it leaves religion on the 
solid foundation of its 'ltm inherent validity without any connection with 
tempera!. authority und no ki.nd of oppression can take place."65 Mr. Wilson and 
Mr. Lancaster66 co11tinued to object to the lack of a religious test oa.tho The 
latter presented the most logical caae for the oppositiono 
As to the religious testp had the article which excluded it, pro-
vided that none but what had.been in the states heretofore, I would 
not have objected to ito It would secure religion. Religious 
liJ?Nl.x . ..Q..~l.ll.. . .i<l . .9.£...NOVided .!Q.!:. • •• I did not r.uppose that the 
pope could occupy the president 1 s chair. But let u~ remember that 
we form a government for millions not yet in existence. I have not 
the art of divinationo ooo This is most certain, that papists may 
occupy that chair and ·mahometans may take ito ~.!.§.A disqualifi-
cation I believe in evett state in the union - it ought to be so in 
~ s;ystem. (Emphasis supplied")Sl - - - - - -
·---·-------·~-----------". 
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66Ibid. p p.2120 
67Ibidoi p.215. see aloo similar expression in South Carolina.w p.30, herein. 
It is int,Jrosting and pedlB.p3 s.igni.ficant that thia was tho onJy time in the 
1·ecorde1 deba.ton U1at this suggestion was ma.de - a very logic.:a.1 one for those 
who were concerned not only about the "papista and mahometans" but also about 
the role of the $ta.tes in the new government. 
There was considori:(ble debate in North Carol ino» as in Virginia, as to 
whether the Constitu.tion chould be accepted immcdillhly or after the addition 
of amendments. Iredell sur,gested that H be ratiffod i.mmJdb.te1y so the.t 
North Ot~r·oU•m cl'!J.egates '!Ould participate in the first Congress and have a 
'9 hanri in the drafting of the Bill of Hight~. r, Willif'! .Jones, one of the leadt'r:1 
~ of' lhfl opposition, quoted a letter from Jefferson to !·!adiaon stating that he 
(1foff'orson) wanted nine state1..~ to r,1t:1Sy in order to pr.::sorve tl'!G union, Emd 
th~ :)there to rejoct so that there might ho ~ertdnty of amcndmanta. 69 To 
.hal p aol vo thin problem, a comroit;tee Wfrn tippointect to submit .qmen1m::nta. 70 
The report of tha!; oomnit:tee, e·1h~red on the journal prior to a vote on +he 
Constitution itsa1f, begtJ.n 1 
].gs.Qly_!!fl~ That a d~olaraHon of rights asserting and Mcuring 
frorr encroachment thr.> great principles of civi.1 and religious 
liberty tin~ the unal:!.enable rights of +he peopln oup,-ht to be 
la.id he!'ore Conr,reaa , •• , 71 
ments to the Constitution itself. Tha twentieth section of the Declaration of 
Rights wan lii'tml verbRtim from tho 17'76 \:ira.i.nia 1>9ClAro.tion but a.dde 
thRt no particul~r reHgi.ous Rec·~ nr soci"lty ou~ht t::i h9 favored 
~I' <?ot'lhl ish"?d by law in pr.eforenr,t:· t0 o+tiern, 7L:: 
____ . ________ _...,.....,.___..._......._.. ... 
681Q!..io ~ p,?21. 
69thJ,9_. 1 p.224; s~e also Carl Van Doren, .T.ti~ £1t~il Jlr,.b<3p.rsl'-l, New York, 
rrh~ 'Tik:i.ng Presa, (1948). p.2J7. 
'T0,,11· t 2"7 72 tbi_d~ 
"' 10 ' p. ) • . 
7lTbid,., p.2~. 
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It was this identical .'ltne!ldment which Hhode I">Jand submittel to the Congress 
::ilmost two yea-:-s later. De~pi te tb~ parHcmentary m'l.nouvering. th~ conv~mtion 
adjourned hur:ust 2, 1788, withm,it accepti:lg or reje~ting the Constitution. The 
Committee report and the Consti tu ti on itself wert> finally accepted by ~forth 
Carolina in November of 1789.73 
The records of tlle debetr.s of the ratifying conventions fill more than 
t>-iree volumes of Elliot 1 s and eve--:y sjgnificant ;reference to relie-ion has been 
mentioned herein - it is obviou2 that re:'.igfon was a relutiveJy minor issue, 
There did not appear to be a g:'.·:,;at concern abm;t relie;ion as such in the ratify-
inP," convent:i ons, perhaps because it w•tn a freed"lm which was not .. then being 
threetened. There was far greater concern and far more discussion about the 
trad.itional "rights of Englishr:ien 1 " tho.se rights such as trial by jury, habeas 
corpus, etc., those legal safeguards which their colonial experience had taught 
them could be withheld with disastrous results. It ',"las thn protection of these 
rights which led to the Bill of Eirrhts; a clause protectine religious freedom 
was added almost as an after-thought, and in several ins~ances ~''ithout a:r.y 
discussion. 
Chapter IV 
In the opinion of many Congressmen~ the first order of business of the 
newly convened Congress of the United St;;,t(~s wru'? the preparation of ..A..mendlnents 
to the Constitution. Mar.y of the ratifying comrentions had made it abundantly 
clear that they were not satisfied that their rights were "\dequately protected 
from the new central government~ On June 8 9 1789 9 a motion was made in the 
House of Representatives to consider amendments to the Constitutiono1 A com-
mittee, ~onsisting of a member from each state, was appointed to meet and con-
sider the various proposals which had been submitted by the Stateso2 The 
committee, led by Madison, made its report on July 28th and August 13th, 1789; 
the House met as a comm.itt~~ of the whole~ The recorded debates for that 
session are very brief. The amendments concerning religion were consolidated 
into one, which as originally submitted, was as follows: 
no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal 
rights of conscience be infringedo3 
A Mr. Sylvester was concerned about the way it was expressed; he feared it 
might tend to abolish religion altogether.4 Mr. Gerry felt it would read 
--------~-==-~·- ............ ~. ~-
1History of Congress, The Proceedil)gs o_f 1hQ. Se~ an_d Hou~ .Qf. 
R~presentatives, 1789-93 (Philadelphiag Lea and Blanchard, 1843}~!, 152. 
hereinafter referred to .qi:t fil.:'to_n:. of Congresso 
2
,.b.d ~· 
3Dc:b9.tes .Q1:. Congress.'., fm l1fil. to 1856 (New York~ Do Appleton and 
ComJ..u.ny, 1857), I, 136. 
4T. • d 
.dll:_, 
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better if it was thAt nno religious doctrine shall be established by law,"5 
and Mro Sherman insisted, as he had at the Constitutional Convention, that the 
whole thing was unnecessary because Congress had no power in that area.6 
Mr. Carroll was in favor of adopting the words because 
the rights of conscience are in their nature of peculiar delicacy 
and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand; and 
as many sects have concurred. in opinion that i;ney are not secured 
under the present constitution o•o it would tend more towards 
conciliating the minds of the people to the government than almost 
any other proposed amend.mento 
He was not disposed to argue over the phraseolog-J = his object was t~ secure 
the substance in such a measure "as to satisfy the wishes of the honest part 
of the community. 117 
James Madison advised the House that he understood tha words to mean 
that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce 'the 
legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God 
in any manner contrary to their conscienceo8 
,'l ,\:lr. Huntington said that he understood it the way Madison did, l.>ut that 
others had construed it 11in such a latitude as to be extremely nurtful. to the 
cause of relig:i.on." Ministers and meeting houses we:re supported by contribu-
tions of those who belonged to their societies which were regulated by by-laws. 
He was afraid that if action were brought in Federal Court on any of these 
cases, the person who had neglected to perform his engagement could not be com-
pelled to do so, lor support of ministers or place of worship mi-ght be con-
strued into a religious establisbment.9 Another member of the House stated 
that by the Charter in RhodP Island, no religion could be established and "the 
people were enjoying the fruits of ito" He hoped the amendment could be 
worded in such a way as to secure the rights of conscience but not to patronize 
7Ibid. 
8Ibid. 
9tbid. 
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those who professed no religion at a11.10 Madison suggested inserting the 
word "national" before tnreligiono" Gerry objected strenuously to this because 
this implied a national government rather than a federal government.11 Another 
gentleman suggested that it be worded: "Congress shall make no laws ..... 12 
The motion was passed 31 to 200 
The rest of the amendments were debated and on August 18th the following 
was adopted by the House of Representatives: 
3o Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or pro-
hibiting free exercise thereof; nor shall the rights of con-
science be infringed •o~l3 
In the Senate a motion was made to strike "religion •oo thereof" and to sub-
stitute "one religious sect or society in preference to others... This motion 
failed. A motion to reconsider then prevailed, and fl motion to strike "3" 
altogether was made; this, toov was defeatedo Finally the words "nor shall 
the rights of conscience be infringed" were stricken 9 and the article agreed 
t 14 o. 
Twelve amendments were submitted to the states for ratification on 
September 25, 1789; of these, ten were ratified and the first two were re-
jected.15 The amendments went into effect December of 1791, when Virginia, 
the eleventh state, gave its approval. Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachu-
setts did not formally ratify the Bill of Rights until 1941 as part of the 
one hundred and fiftieth anniversary celebration of the birth of the Bill of 
Rights. 
School children for generations have been nurtured on the story that a 
few courageous men by their insistence on a Bill of Rights created and 
lOibid. 
11Ibid.' p.1380 
12Ibido 
l3History.Q! Congress, pol52. 
14Ibido 
15Elliot I, 3750 
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preserved religious liberty for all time.16 As a matter of fact, the main 
battle for religious freedom had already taken place in the States, and it was 
not the intent of the delegates at the ratifying conventions nor the men of 
the First Congress to enlarge upon their religious rights, but rather to pro-
tect from the encroachment of the central government those rights they 
already had. The Constitution, by its silence, left the power to legislate 
regarding religion to the states; most of the states had already indicated 
through their own fundamental laws that freedom of conscience was an 11inalien-
able right" dependent on a higher authority and not subject to governmental 
interference. The First Amendment of the Bill of Rights was an expression of 
this belief o 
16
rn retrospect, this may be true; today it is the Federal Government 
which is the protector of the inalienable rights of man, and it is fortunate 
for us that there was an insistence on a Bill of Rights. 
Chapter V 
SUMMATION 
The Puritans who settled Plymouth and Massachusetts migrated for the 
sake of freedom of conscience, but it was their .QID1 conscience they were con-
cerned with - the freedom to establish a monoply of their own religiono It 
was men like Roger Williams and William Penn who recognized the obUgation of 
toleration as well as the right of choiceo They recogrd:T.ed the right of 
others to be different and started the American tradition of t•peaceful co-
existencett among religious sectso The prciprietary colonies seeking population 
and trade rather than religious freedom also moved towards toleration. The 
variety of peoples and beliefs in Pennsylvania1 New York, Maryland, and the 
Caroli.nas worked for tolerance on practical groundso The age of enlighten-
ment with its liberal thought and the Great Awakening with the resultant 
multiplicity of sects also fostered the spirit of tolerationo One writer 
describing religious freedom in the Colonial period said, "Although the 
cornerstones •• o had not yet been laid, the foundations were being excava-
ted.111 By the time of the Revolution, tolerance was almost universal in the 
Colonies. 
What did American independence mean for religious liberty? Religious 
liberty is not an isolated reality; it exists and is inseparable from 
measures of liberty and independence, freedom from authority, and respect for 
1Joseph L. Blau, Cornerstones .Q.f. Religious Freedom in America (Boston: 
Th~ Beacon Press, 1950), po35. 
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the worth and dignity of mano 'l'he doctrine of the nunalionable rights of man" 
was the guiding star of the Hevolutiono It was these ri~hts which were articu-
lated and codified by the people in the fifteen years from the Decl~ratio4 of 
Independence to the Bill of Rightso2 
A study of these references to religion suggests that a consensus had 
been reached: religion was a private matter bet~cen man an0 bis God and not 
the concern of government; freedom of conscience was one of the inalienable 
rights of man; that all men have an equal~ natural and unalienable right to 
the free exercise of their religion~ i·1ithout compulsion or restraint; an.::. all 
religious sects are entitled to equal treatment from the government. Perhaps 
the general attitude can best be summed up ns 111ive and let live.•: The 
philosophy of lais~-faire applied to religion. 
There is no doubt that the people of the new nation were a religious 
people. Their documents abound with references to their debt and their grati-
tude to the Creatoro By and large, their religious feeling was a personal one, 
with definite opposition to outside compulsion of any sortc No church should 
be established, no man should be forced to support a church (even in those 
states which attempted to establish churches, a man could support the church 
of his choice), no clergyman could hold state office while practicing his 
pastoral functions. Time and time again, conventions were assured that be-
cause of the diversity and multiplicity of sects, no one denomination was 
strong enough to establish itself as an official church~ 
There was also general agreement that morality and piety are necessary 
ingredients of good government, and considerable concern that "Jews, infidels, 
-------~ --------~----...-_, .. .._. .. _.._._., .. ~ 
2For an excellent swnmary of the actual practice in the states at the 
time of the Constitution, see !Ii. Searle Bates, Religious Liberty: lill. Inquiry 
(rfow York: International I!Iissionary Council, 1945), p.215< 
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papists and mohametanstt might not be moral or pious enough to hold office.3 
But they also realized that if they restricted the rights of one denomination, 
their own rights could also be restricted; they recognized the liberty of 
others in order to protect their own liberty. Most of the states did restrict 
the right to hold office because of religious belief, but this was the only 
civil disability which existed in any of the states, contrary to the situation 
which prevailed in most of the rest of the world. A man could vote, hold pro-
perty, sue and be sued, appear as a w~tnesa, etc, 1 regardless of his religious 
beliefso In no other country was religious freedom so widespreade 
The First Amendment left to the states the problem of freedom of con-
science and the establishment of an official church. But the principles codi-
fied by the First ~endment had already been established in the states: they 
were an expression of the status guoo The new aspect of religious freedom 
which was added by the Constitution - the removal of civil disabilities be-
cause of religious belief - was passed in the Constitutional Convention with-
ou1 discussion, and adopted by the states almost as a matter of course. This 
was a departure from the practice of most of the states, but only South 
Carolina thought it sufficiently offensive to require amending. This final 
step for full religious liberty was accomplished, on the Federal level, with-
out difficultyo 
3nespite constitutional provisions, North Carolina elected Catholic 
Thomas Burke to the Continental Congress, and elected him Governor in 
1781, ~Of p.216. 
PART II 
Chapter I 
THE ISSUE IS JOINED: 
Are the views of the Revolutionary gene~ation pertinent in resolving 
the complex freedom of religion issues which have been facing the Supreme 
Court in recent years? The Constitution and Bill of Rights represent the 
views of no single man but rather the compromises of many men. While the 
opinions of Jefferson and Madison on religion are enlightening, they are not 
part of the Constitutiono An understanding of the history and background of 
the Constitutional period can allow the Court to better discern the Framers' 
intentions, but these intentions can and have been interpreted in diverse 
ways. The Constitution provides a broad frame of reference, not specific 
answers, for where the Constitution does provide answers, questions do not 
arise. Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "It is when the colors do not match, when 
the references in the index fail, when there is no decisive precedent, that 
the serious business of the court begins. 111 When the Establishment clause 
was first considered by the Supreme Court, the colors did clash. There was 
no index and no precedent to help the Court in its very serious businesso 
The purpose of this section of the study is to examine the "serious 
business" of the Supreme Court in its current interpretations of the religious 
clause of the First Amendment. 
To the man in the street, it appeared that the furor over religion in the 
1Benjamin N. Cardozo, Nature -2!, ~ Judicial Process, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, (1921), p.21. 
46 
schools began with th& 1962 Regents 0 Prayer case; it did not. As a matter of 
fact, this case was the climax of a battle which has been waged in the state 
courts for over one hundred years, and in the United States Supreme Court 
since 1947. The current controversy over religious observances in the public 
schools is tied to the origins of the American public school, the history of 
religious controversy, and the extent and significance of religious observ-
ances in the schools prior to the 1962 ruling. 
The first •'public" schools in this country were the church-supported 
•~town" schools of puritan New England 11 which gradually evolved into the free 
2 
common school. As the free common school grew9 quarrels arose among the 
various Protestant sects as to the type of religious and moral teaching to be 
given in these schools. Although it was generally agreed among the sects that 
the 3chools would be secular institutions, they retained a distinctly Protea-
'tant - an.:i puritan - flavor. The coming of both Catholic and Jewish immi-
grants in the last half of the 19th Century, not only changed the religious 
complexion of the country but also brought with it challenges to the Protes-
tant features of public education. 3 
Every state has in its Constitution a provision protecting religious 
liberty. In addition, twelve state constitutions specifically prohibit sec-
tarian instruction in the public schools4 and all but Vermont have constitu-
tional provisions prohibiting the expenditure of public funds, or at least 
2 See for example, provisions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
Constitutions, supra pol4. For a comprehensive review of the evolution of 
the public school, see Donald Eo Boles, The Bible, Religion~ Public 
Schools, (Ames, Iowa: The State University Press, 1963), pp.2-36; and Paul 
Blanchard, Religionl!!!9..~ Public Schools? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 
pp. 1-27. 
3Blanchard, ~·.ill• Po 7 • 
4Joseph W. Harrison, "The Bible Education~ and the Public Schools," 
29 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, (1962) p.381; see also 45 ALR 2d 742 (1956)0 
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school funds, for sectarian purposes.5 The problem of what constitutes sec-
tarian instruction, however, has been left to the courtso Eleven states re-_ 
quire by statute the reading of the Bible in the public classroom; statutes 
in five states authorize, but do not require, reading from the Bible in the 
classroom, and various legal bodies in twenty-three states have upheld prac-
tices and laws requiring or authorizing this practice. On the other hand, in 
eleven states, legal bodies have declared Bible reading a sectarian practice 
and therefore forbidden by State and/or Federal Constitutionso 
Those states which require or authorize Bible reading typically leave the 
choice of the version of the Bible to be used to the participants, and in re-
cent years, have included excusal provisions; these statutes usually specify 
that the l'eading is to be "without comment11 or explanation. (In actual prac-
tice this raises a problem; if the passage is not explained, many children do 
not understand it, and if it is explained, the explanation is likely to be the 
.. ' 
teacher 8s own personal sectarian interpretationo) Although the main focus in 
recent years has been on Bible reading and prayer, there are many other sec-
tarian (i.e. Christian) practices in the public schools. Observance of relig-
ious holidays such as Christmas and Easter, Baccalaureate services, ministers 
at school assemblies, teachers in religious garb, religious art in the schools, 
religious tests in hiring teachers, and credit for church-sponsored Bible 
classes are a few of the more prevalent ones. 
Although practices in regard to religion in the schools vary from one 
part of the country to anotherj those in the Texas public schools appear to 
5Boles, .Q.E.• cit. p,43. 
6Harrison, op .. cit~ po38l et~·; Boles, .Q.E.• cito pp.43-57 o 
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present a typical picture.7 A study revealed that 7gfo of the schools respond-
ing to a questionnaire had some form of Bible reading; 89% conducted prayer 
exercises; 99% had Christmas programs While only 11% observed the Jewish holi-
days. In fifteen school districts 9 ministers, priests 9 and nuns wearing cleri-
cal garb served as teachers in the public school8. Religious surveys of pupils 
were taken, and despite a Texas law stating that no school ~eaching personnel 
is to be asked ndirectly or indirectly'" about his religious affiliation, 9zt 
of all respondents indicated that an effort is made to determine whether or 
not the applicant has a religious affiliation.. 'l:he author concludes that "at 
the present, the religious practices in the public schools of Texas seem less 
an aid for the education of all children than they are a support for (Protes-
tant) sectarian purposeso" 
The Tennessee Supreme Court 9 in 1956, upheld a state statute requiring 
a· the daily reading of the Bible in the public schools. The decision revealed 
that the King James version of the Bible was read in the classroom, that the 
Lor<P s Prayer was recited, and that hymnR were frequently sung; it also re-
vealed that teachers commonly asked students questions pertaining to the 
daily Bible reading. A survey in 19609 showed a very high level of compliance 
with the Knoxville, Tennessee Board of Education ruling requiring "Bible read-
ing without comment.'' However, over two-thirds of the teachers "defined" 
certain words (definition of certain key words would certainly be considered 
interpretation and come within the realm of ttcomment") and some teachers indi-
cated that they refused to excuse a student from r~ls turn at reading the 
7Earl L. Humble, !,e.lJ..P.jous R.r~tic_ll 1!1 Texas Public Sghools% unpublished 
thesis, Southwestern Theological Seminary1 Fort Worth, Texas, summarized; 
Pamphlet, Anti-Defamation League of Bunai B0rith, New York~ 
8carden v. Bland, 199 Tenno 665, 288 S.WQ2d 718 (1956)0 
9Harrison, .Ql?.o.ill•• p~395, ,.ilo~c 
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Biblee 'I'he majority of teachers furnished the Bible to be used, althoi:.gh in 
some instances it was furnished by the school, by interested religious groups, 
or by Gideon Internationalo The time spent varied from less than 5 minutes to 
15 minutes~ It is not without significance that although few of the teachers 
would abolish the program, "the overwhelming majority ••o were rather conserva-
tive in their praise for the program."lO In addition to Bible reading (which 
is the only religious activity authorized by statute) pupils participated in 
recitation of prayers, religious plays~ Bibical map drawing~ Bible memory 
drills, Chapel programs and other related activities~11 In the majority of 
the schools, elementary pupils participated in various religious practices for 
the holidays, permission was granted for the distribution of religious liter-
ature by church groups, ministers were frequently invited to give talks which 
were either inspirational or descriptive of their religion; some schools had 
compulsory chapel attendance, and some had an elective course in Bible for 
which as much as one unit of credit was giveno 
~ There are interesting regional differences in the extent of religious 
12 practices in the schools throughout the countryo To the question ttare home-
room devotional services held in the schools of your system?", of all school 
systems, 68.% of those in the East and 60}& of those in the South had such de-
votionals in contrast with the Midwest with 6% and the West with only 2/oc 
Bible reading was conducted in 67/o of the Eastern schools, 76% of the Southern 
.. 
lOibido, p.400 
11Ib·d 
._.A_., 
12Ricbard B. Dierenfieldj Religion i.B, American Public Schools, (Public 
Affairs Press, 1962). This work was introduced into the record of the House 
Judiciary Committee, Hearings Before the Committee .Q.U ~ Judiciary House 2f.. 
Representatives, 88th Congress, {u.s. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C., 1964) on the proposed amendments to the Constitution relating to prayers 
and Bible reading in the Public Schools (herinafter ref erred to as Hearings) 
and is quoted therefrom~ pp.2414-2440. 
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schools, but in only 18}0 of llidwestern and 11% of Western schools.13 Of those 
questioned concerning "released time" only lo% of the Southern schools had such 
a program, while 44% of Eastern, 2gf., of Western9 and 27/o of Midwestern schools 
participated$14 Interestingly enough 9 when school administrators were asked 
their opinions of the released time program~ there was much more uniformity of 
opinion - only a few percentage points separated the administrators in various 
parts of the country. 21}b in the United States aa a whole felt that this pro-
gram was of no value, while only l~ felt it wan of great value.15. 
The action of state courts in this area presents no similar geographic 
pattern, but rather reflects the diversity of American religious practice$. 
The highest courts of eleven states have held that various state and local 
statutes requiring Bible reading in the schools do not violate state constitu-
tions (Colorado 11 Georgia., Iowa, Kansas? Maine, Michigan, Uebraska, New Jersey, 
Ohio, Texas, Tennessee) and four have held Bible reading unconstitutional under 
state constitutions (Illinois, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin).16 The 
first of these state cases was decided in 1854,17 almost a hundred years before 
religious freedoms of the First Amendment were considered by the United States 
Supreme Court; obviously, the is5'Ue is not a new one! 
In 1925- the Supreme Court held that the right of a parent to send his 
child to a private or parochial school was a property right under the Due 
l3Hearings, ~024180 
14 Ibido p.24270 
-· 
15Ibid$ p.2435. 
16For a summary of these decisionst see Harrison~ .2.R•illo ppo38l-385; 
see also, Abington School District -:f..o Schempp, po374 UoS. 203 (1963); con-
curring opinion of !fro Justice Brennan9 p.2c-o 
17nonahoe i· Richards, 38 Meo 3761 (1854)0 
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Process clause of the Fourteenth Am.end.ment18 and in 19:50, the Court permitted 
Louisiana to use state funds for text books for parochial elementary schools 
without even mentioning the First 1.mendmento This case introduced the "child 
benefit theoryo 1119 Nro Justice Cardo~o extended the application of the First 
Amendme11t to the states in the Cantwell case in 1940}0 This decision~ and 
subsequent "Jehovah 0s Witnesses cases" based on the F'ree Exercise Clause of 
the First Amendment~ 21 served to define the broad outlines of the meaning of 
freedom of religion, thus paving the way for more conventional sects to claim 
protection from any kind of religious discrimination or establishment even 
when it was completely sanctioned by local law and local custom. 
Abortive attempts wor~ rnade to bring the ''religion in the schools" issue 
before the $'upreme Court, but it was not until 1962 that the opponents of 
Bible reading in the schools succeeded. In the meantime~ the first major 
case involving the schools and religion decided under the Establishment 
clause of the First Amendment was the Everson22 case in 19470 The Court held 
that a local ordinance authorized by New Jersey statute, providing for 'bus 
transportation for parochial school pupils was not an Establishment and there-
fore constitutional. The following year, an Illinois on-premises released-
time23 program was held to be an unconstitutional Establishment, while in 1952, 
the New York state program of off-premises released-time24 was held 
18Pierce .Y> Society .Qf, Sisters, 281 U o So 370, ( 1930) ., 
19cochran Y.• I.ouisiana~ 281 v. U.S. 5109 (1930). 
20cantwell Y.• Connecticut, 310 U.So 296, (1940). 
21Minersville v. Gobiti.s, 310 U.S. 586, (1940); ~Virginia Y.o Barnette, 
319 u.s. 624, (1943T~ 
22mverson Y.• ~ ..Qf, Education of Ewing Township, 330 U .s. 1 11(1947). 
23ricCollum v. Board of Education, 333 UoS• 203, (1948). 
-------- ---
24zorach y. QJausen, 343 U .s. 3061) (1952) •. 
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constitutional. 
Ten years later the controversial issue of prayers in the schools was 
finally considered by the Court, In the F.ngel25 case, in finding the New York 
State Board of Regents~ prayer an unconstitutional establishmP-nt, the Court 
stated irthat it is not the business of government to compose and prescribe 
official prayersotr In the heat of the controver.Jy which followed the Court's 
holding in th.is case, the decision which really went to tho hP.a,..t of the 
26 27 
matter was almost unnoticed. The §.c:..l?.emp,E and Mu;:raz mises, from Pennsyl-
vania. and Harylandj concerned the traditional 1''morning devotional, 11 and held 
that reading the Bible and reciting the Lordijs Frayer in the public tax-
surported schools is clearly an unconstitutional establishment of religion. 
~?~.!.o Vitale~ 370 U.So 421, \1962)0 
26 Abi.ngton ,Yo Ilgll..fil!illll, £mo£ilo 
27Murrt!Y.!.• Curlettr 374 U.S. 203, (1963), hereinafter referred to, 
together with above cane, as SchemPPo 
Chapter II 
VOX POPULI 
The _public reaction which followed the Engel case was swift, emotional, 
vehement, and perhaps inevitable in view of the political temper of the times. 
No Supreme Court decision since the school desegregation cases aroused so much 
emotion - condemnation of the Court and its decision appeared to be almost 
unanimous.. Herbert Hoover called the decision a "disintegration of one of the 
most sacred American heritages, "1 a South Carolina Congressman2 said, ••r know of 
nothing in my lifetime that could give more aid and comfprt to Moscow than this 
bold, TilB.licious, atheistic, and sacrilegious twist of this unpredictable group 
of uncontrolled despots." Senator Sam J. Ervin of North Carolina declared 
thRt "••o the Supreme Court has held that God is unconstitutional and for that 
reR"IOn, the public schools must be segregated against Him?03 Representative 
George Andrews of Alabama said, "They put the negroes in the schools and now 
they have driven God out 11 ; 4 and former President Eisenhower, "I have always 
thought this Nation was essentially a religious one. 115 
l.rrME Magazine, July 6, 1962, p.8 .. 
21. Mendel Rivers 1 quoted in 1ifil!. York Times, July ~' 1962, p.lOE. 
3Ibid. 
4new ~_Times, July l, 1962. seco 4, p.lo 
5Ibid. For a summary of opinions - see Paul G~ Kauper, "Prayer, Public 
Schools and the Supreme Court," 61 Mico LoR. 1031, (1963) and Blanchard, .QJ2.•.£ii• 
p.52 et.seq. 
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t:ardinal Spellman commenced a blistering attack on the Court with "This de-
cigion atrikes at the very heart of the Godly tradition in which America~s 
children have for so long been raisedc~6 Commented the New York Post in an 
editorial entitled "Prayer and Politics," "The indignation of the Catholic 
hierarchy is understandableo It is prompted, we suspect, not over the prohibi-
tion of a prayer which many churchmen would agree has little religious value, 
but by the potential impact of the decision on the aid-to-education battle. 117 
Billy Graham deplored the Court's secularism - "The framers of our Constitution 
meant we were to have freedom of religion and not freedom from religion."8 
Bishop James A. ~e of the California Protestant Episcopal Diocese, issued a 
legal attack on the decision and immediately commenced a movement for a consti-
tutional amendment. 9 The reaction of other Protestant churchmen was mixed and 
somewhat more moderate. The initial Methodist reaction was that the decision 
was an "obvious blow to religions freedom," and "in eH'ect makes secularism the 
national religion." A few days later, the National Council o!' Churches, through 
its Director of Religious Liberty~ asserted "Many Christians will welcome this 
decision. It protects the religious rights of minorities and guards against 
the development of 'public school religion' which is neither Christianity or 
Judaism, but something less than either~ulO The American Baptists tended to be 
favorable to the decision, while the Unitarians expressed unequivocal approval. 
The ~'upreme Court received strong support from the 1963 General Assembly of the 
United Presbyterian Church which opposed Bible reading and prayer in the public 
6New York~' June 26, 19629 pQL 
7summarized in !ru! ~Times, June 29, 19620 
8New York Times, July l, 1962, seco4, p~lo 
---
9Blanchard, .QJ?.•.Qllo pp.171-1730 
lOibid., po65. 
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classrooms9 which declared, "We Presbyterians wish to live, teach, A.Ild evangel-
ize in a political order in which no church will dominate the civil authorities 
or be dominated by them."11 
The Jewish Community has been almost unanimous in its support of the 
Court's position. The American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, 
and the .Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B~rith ware among the organizations 
which f'iled amicus briefs in the~ case. The Synagogue Council of America, 
through its president, Ilro Julius Marksg stated, "It has been our belief that 
prayer of any sort should be fostered in the home, church, and synagogue and 
that public institutions such as the public school should be free of such sec-
tarian practices. We have further held to the belief that prayer of 'common 
core' can only lead to a watering down of all that is spiritually meaningful in 
every religious faithon12 
The Congressional critics of the Court were given a boost by the Confer-
ence of American Governors 9 meeting at Hershey, Pennsylvania :ln July of 1962 
which passed an almost unanimous resolution that the right to have non-
denominational prayers in the public schools be restored by Constitutional 
amendment - Governor Rockefeller was the only governor who did not vote, on 
the ground that he needed more time to study the mattero For days following 
the decisions, the Letters to the Editor columns were filled with denunciations 
of the Court. The impression gained from reading the periodicals was of vir-
tually unanimous opposition to the Court and its holding. Gradually, however, 
sentiment began to turn, as one religious leader after another came out in 
favor of the ~ecision. 
12neprinted by .Anti-Defamation League of B~nai B'rith, New York, January, 
1963, pamphlet "Religious Spokesmen in Support of the UoS~ Supreme Court De-
cision on Prayer in the .PubUo Schools.," 
The reaction to the SchempJl and ]:!urray docision of 1963 was almost peace-
ful compared to the storm after 1~1 - although the sentiment against the de-
cision was pr~ctically the same, the decision itself received almost no comment 
in the public press - these decisions entered the public scene like the prover-
bial lambs For one thing, the decision went almost unnoticed because it was 
handed down in June, 1963 when the nation was in the midst of a civil rights 
crisis - the news media were full of the impending march on Washington by Negro 
civil rights workers; for another, the interdenominational character of the de-
cision was emphasized by the fact that the opinion of the Court was assigned 
to Justice Tom Clark, a prominent Presbyterian layman, while concurring opin-
ions were written by Goldberg, the only Jew on the Court, and Brennan, the only 
Catholico In addition, the relatively narrow decision in pngel not only acted 
as a buffer, but made the far more reaching Schempp decision a foregone con-
clusion. 
1 A United Press International survey regarding the opening day of school, 
September, 1963, showed that despite the ban against religious devotions, thou-
sands of children began their first day of school with Bible reading and/or 
prayer13 and Associated Press concluded that most schools continued their for-
mer practices. The New York Times, immediately after the Schempp decision, 
quoted the State Superintendent of Education from Columbia, South Carolina to 
the effect that the state intended to ignore the ruling since South Carolina 
had no law on the subject.14 Alabama was openly defiant, Governor George 
Wallace said, "We donut care what the Supreme Court said"; and two California 
legislatures introduced a bill to prohibit instruction in the Darwinian theory 
sinc13 11if it is illegal to present religion in the schools, it must be equally 
13noak, .Q:Q•fil• p.23o 
11J-une 189 1963~ po29G 
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illegal to present anti-religious doctrineso 1115 Arkansas and Delaware still 
required prayer, other states called for moments of meditation~ inspirational 
reading, or a course of study dealing with the Bibleo16 The same survey showed 
that most of the schools in the West (where the practice was not widespread) 
were abiding by the decision, but in New Jersey, the community of Hawthorne17 
challenged the 1963 Supreme Court's ruling, and according to a school principal 
in one metropolitan area connnunity, "the decision is not enforced throughout the 
state."18 
Th~ most drastic reaction of all came from Congresso Over 148 Resolutions 
proposing .Amendments to the Constitution were submitted by 115 Congressmen.19 
The resolutions which were referred to Emanuel Celler•s House Committee on the 
Judicia:cy had as their main objective to overrule the Supreme Court - to put 
"God back into the schoolso" Typical of these resolutions was H. J. Res. 693, 
88th Congress First Session20 introduced by Frank Jo Becker, Republican from 
New York: 
Sec. lo Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit 
the offering, reading from, or listening to prayers or 
Biblical scriptures, if participation therein is on a 
voluntary basis, in any governmental or public school, 
institution, or placeo 
l5Doak, .QR.. Cit. p.24 .. 
16Ibid .. , p.23. See Frank J. Sorauf, "Zorach v. Clausen: The Impact of a 
Supreme Court Decision" 53 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 777 (1959) for a reviev of 
effects and compliance with that decisiono 
17New York Times, January 16, 1965, p .. lo The American Legion of Hawthorne 
planned to distribute, through the P.T.A., book covers bearing a non-
denominational prayer. The President of the Board of Education said there was 
no legal reason why pupils could not read prayer to themselves every morning. 
18This information was obtained through a personal interview on 
Novemb~~ 16, 1964. 
19H in .... ear gs. pp.iii-vi. 
20 Ibido, p.22. For text of other resolutions, see pp.1-59 of Heariwm_. 
Sec o 2 o Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit 
making reference to belief in, reliance upon 9 or invoking 
the aid of God or a Supreme Being in any governmental or 
public document, proceeding, activity, ceremony, school, 
institution, or place, or upon any coinage, currency~ or 
obligation of the United States. 
Sec. )o Nothing in this article shall constitute an establish-
ment of religion. 
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The testimony at the Hearings of these resolutions, held in April and May 
of 1964, fills 2774 pages in three volumeso At least 73 Congressmen testified, 
almost all in favor of some kind of constitutional amendmento So overwhelming 
did congressional sentiment appear to be, that when Representative B. F. Sisk~ 
(Democrat, California) spoke out against any amendment~ Chainna.n Cellar com-
mented that "you are very much like a breath of cool air in the heat of sum-
mer. •f 21 'I'he list of witnesses reads like the roster of ,who 1 s who in American 
religion" - church leaders from every major faith testified before the Committee-
the great majority of them opposed to any amendment! The proposal.to change the 
First Amendment, as reflected in the mail to the committee, was more agreeable 
to the populace at large than it was to leadership groups, in fact, one witness 
referred to the church leaders as "generals without a.rmieso"22 Constitutional 
lawyers from the nationns leading law schools have rarely been in such complete 
agreement. In addition to the testimony of such prominent Supreme Court critics 
as Paul Freund, Harvard; Philip Kurland, University of Chicago; Dean Jefferson 
B. Fordham, University of Pennsylvania; Dean Willard Heckel, Rutgers University; 
Wilber G. Katz, University of Wisconsin; and Paul G. Kauper, University of 
Michigan; letters and prepared statements were submitted by a great many more 
experts in the Constitutional law field, including a statement signed by 223 
constitutional lawyers. Represented in this group were faculty members and 
21Ibido, P~5.3,3o 
22George LaNove. Hearings, pg2442. 
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deans of law schools all over the country.23 The scholars were unanimous in 
their opposition to an amendment to the Constitutiono In additionj such organi-
zations as the Anti-Defamation League, the American Civil Liberties Union, and 
the National Council of Churches were strongly opposed to any change in the 
First Amendment~24 
In view of the impressive array of opponents to the Becker Amendment~ one 
might well ask who was in favor of the amendmento A great many private citizens 
wrote to the committee asking that prayers be t~put back in the schools.," Indi-
vidual congregations 9 and individual ministers from all over the country, 
Veterans' organizations, Billy Graham7 Cardinal Spellman, and Governor George 
Wallace of Alabama all def ended the "right o~ little children to pray. 1• 25 For-
tunately for the integrity of the First Amendment, the proposal was never··re-
ported out of Committee.26 This was due in a large measure to the skillful and 
diplomatic handling of the Hearings by Chairman Cellar, and to the fact that 
those who were in favor of an amendment were unable to agree on wording which 
would nullify the Supreme Court 9s decision without opening Pandora's box to a 
host of other problems. Who would prescribe the prayers? How much time could 
be devoted to prayer? Is it possible to write a non=denominational prayer? 
lrJhat recourse have those who are offended by the prayer? 'What effect would such 
an amendment have on already existing state prohibitions? 
24-. • 
'Hean.ngs, 
25Hearinga, pe211 ~eseg,o and p.,577 tloseg. The pros and cons of the issue 
are fairly well brought out in the testimony and questioning of Congressman 
Becker, the most active proponent of the measureo 
26The House did manage to show its resentment of the Supreme Court by re-
jecting the Senate's proposed salary increase for the Justices, see Uilliam May, 
"Court Foes Have Field Day," Newark Sunday news, March 22, 1965, sec. 2, p.C). 
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The popular opposition to the Court~s decision can be summed up in three 
categories; l. those who look for any opportunity to discrcdi.t the Court be-
cause of the Courtus recent activist role ~ ioeo Southerners who are still 
smarting under the Segregation decisions, 2. those who '~make political hay" out 
of being in favor of God and against the Court, and 3. those sincere people who 
are genuinely concerned with the umoral decay" of our society and feel that the 
Supreme Court bas taken one more step in that direction, Most would like to 
return to the idyllic days of the status ante~quo - which~ in view of-the long 
history of controversy in this area~ is somewhat like trying to sweep the whole 
issue under the rug and out of sight .. 27 
27As this is being written, Senator Everett Dirksen's attempt to push a 
similar amendment through the Senate failedo The Senate rejected the "Dirksen 
Amendment" by a vote of 49 to 37, nine votes short of the necessary two-thirds 
majorityo ~York Times~ September 21~ 1966, p.l .. 
Chapter III 
OF SCHOOL BUSES AJID RELEASE'D TI!rb'. 
Just what were these cases which aroused such universal public opposition'? 
Although the Engel,9 Schempp and Murray cases were the immediate reason for the 
public outcry, they must be considered with several other equally controversial 
cases which laid the groundwork and established the legal theories on which 
these oases are based. The first of these precedent-making cases was the Hew 
Jersey School bus case in 1947.1 Under a New Jersey statute which authorized 
local school boards to make contracts for the transportation of children to and 
from schools other than private schools operated for profit 9 the township author-
ized reimbursement of bus fares to parents of children in the public schools and 
in the Catholic parochial schoolso This payment of public funds was challenged 
by a district taxpayer as being a violation of the First Amendment of the 
:B'ederal Constitution., The ?few Jersey court of original jurisdiction held that 
the statute in question was a violation of the New Jersey Constitution,2 while 
the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed the Trial Court saying 
that it violated neither the Federal nor the State Constitutiono3 As a case of 
first impression, a great deal of interest was aroused - the American Civil 
Liberties Union appeared as amicus curiae for Everson, while the Attorneys ~ 
1Everson ,Y:o Board .2.t Education .Ql. ~ Tovnshi.E. 91.. E.)!;i.p,g~ 330 U GSo 1, (1947). 
239; .• 2d 75 (1944) 0 
344Ao 2d 333 (1945)e 
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General of several states and the National Council of Catholic Men appeared for 
the school boardo Mr. Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion, was 
joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed, Douglas and Murphy. 
Mr. Justice Black began his analysis of the problem with a comprehensive 
discussion of the background of the First Amendment, with special attention to 
Madison's Remonstrance and Jefferson°s "wall of separation," and with partic-
ular emphasis on the feeling of the Founding Fathers that no individual should 
be taxed to support a religious institution of any kindo He then gave his now-
famous definition of the Establishment clause. 
The Establishment clause means at least this: 4 
1. Heither state nor federal government can set up a church. 
2. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all re-
ligions, or prefer one religion over another.5 
3. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or remain 
away from church against his will or force him to profess 
belief or disbelief in any religion. 
4. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing 
religious beliefs or disbeliefs or for church attendance 
or non-attendanceo 
5. No tax in any amount can be levied to support any religious 
activities or institutions - whatever form they may adopt, 
teach or practice. 
6 o ?lei ther state nor federal government can openly or secretly 
participate in affairs of any religious organization or 
groups or vice versa. 
"In the words of Jefferson, the r.lause against establishment of religion by law 
was intended to erect a ewall of separation' between church and state. •t6 One is 
4Everson, .2:2•.ill•, pp~l5-16" 
5The local ordinance applied only to Catholic parochial schools, a fact 
which was evidently not considered significant by the majority, however, this 
point is raised by Justice Jackson in his dissent at po20 and Rutledge, p.62. 
6Everson, ,QRcill,o, ppol5~16., 
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mildly astonished to read Justice Black"s conclusion ~ in view of this broad 
language - that ttthe wall must be kept high and impregnableo WP would not 
approve the slightest breacho New Jersey has not breached it hereo"7 
In upholding the school board, the majority compared providing transporta-
tion to providing services of police and fire which is, of course, extended to 
all; nthe state contributes no money to the church schools, it does not support 
them, tiU 11 We must be careful in protecting the citizens of lrew Jersey against 
state established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit 
new Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all citizens with-
out regard to their religious beliefs."9 Thus the child-benefit theory appeared 
in full bloomo The benefit of the legislation is for the child; any benefit 
which the church may receive is o~ly incidental. 
Four Justices dissentedo Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, 
went into considerable detail to show that the parochial school is a vital part 
of the Catholic church's program; attendance is made compulsory, and the cur-
riculum is prescribed by the dioceseo He was very critical of the majority, 
and easily distinguished fire and police protection from the furnishing of bus 
transportation - in the later case he pointed out, the test by which the bene-
ficiaries of the expenditure were chosen is essentially a religious one; ignor-
ing this religious test is the basic fallacy of the majorityolO Freedom of re-
ligion is set forth in absolute termso ~This is not, therefore, just a little 
case over bus fareso In paraphrase of Madison, distant as it may be in its 
present form from a complete establishment of religion, it differs from it 
7Ibid°' pol8. Since so much of what is said above is completely unnecess-
ary to the result actually reached by the Court, one cannot help but feel that 
what started out to be a reversal~ became in the course of deliberations, an 
affi:rmance - did one of the Justices switch sides? 
8Ibido lOibid., p.25o 
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only in degree; and it is the first step in that directioJl_nll 
The seconci. dissent, by Justice Rutledge~ in which he was joined by 
Justice Burton as well as Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, is believed by 
many writers to be the classic statement of the problem, and the view that will 
ultimately prevail$ He, too, relied on history9 and incorporated Madison's 
views into his interpretation of the First Amendmento He is concerned, how-
ever, not so much with thP intentions )f the Founding Fathers regarding speci-
fie areas involving religion, hut rather with the overall purpose of the First 
12 Amendmento The purpose 11f the :Pirst Amendment was Hto create a complete and 
permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority 
by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion." 
Transportation is an integral part of schooling which cannot be separated from 
the paying of tuition or teachers 8 salaries or books, the benefit to the church 
is real and not incidenta1.13 According to Justice Rutledge, two great drives 
are constantly in motion to abridge, in the name of Aducation, the complete 
division of religious and civil authority; one to introduce religious educa-
tion and observances into the public schools and the other to obtain public 
funds for aid and support of various private religious schools - 1tin my opinion, 
both avenues were closed by-the Constitutiono Neither should be opened by this 
Court, 1114 
The following year, the court was almost unanimous in its decision in the 
McCollum caseo15 The plaintiff9 a resident, taxpayer 9 and parent of a child 
attending the school in question, objected to the Illinois '~released time" 
program. The program, sponsored by the various religious denominations of the 
11Ibido t Po57 e 
12Ibid.~ ppo3l-44o 
l)Ibido~ po48• 
14Ibido9 pe63o 
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communityv consisted of weekly religious teachings in the school during school 
hours. Participation was voluntary, and those who did not participate in reli-
gious instruction had their regular secular studiese16 In an eight to one deci-
sion, this practice was held to be an unconstitutional Establishment. Justice 
Black again wrote the opinion of the Courte After reviewing the facts, he 
found that nthis is beyond question, the utilization of tax-established and tax-
supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith, 1117 
the state provides pupils for religious classes through the use of the state~s 
compulsory school machinery - this constitutes an establishment "as we inter-
preted it in Everson. 1118 
Justice Frankfurter~ concurring in the decision and speaking for the dis-
senters in Everson,19 reviewed the history of public education and religious 
instruction. .Although the separation principle was established early in the 
1860 1s, community leaders concerned with giving children some religious instruc-
tion tried to bring this instruction in during the child~s "working day." By 
1914, this practice had evolved into "released timeo 1120 In Illinois, the fact 
that the power of the school board had not been used to discriminate between 
religions was not material; the fact that the child was offered an alternative 
reduced constraint~ but did not eliminate the influence of the school in mat-
ters sacred to conscience and outside the school 0 s domain. 21 Frankfurter 
16Ibid., ppo205-206o 
17Ibid., Pe210 .. 
18Ibid., 
19Justices Rutledge and Burton also concurred in the Court 0 s opinion. 
Ibid., p.213. 
20Ib"d 
__1._o ~ pp.213-2240 
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stated that if the child were "villing"~ other time could be found - dismissed 
time could be utilized?22 but in the present set of facts, the momentum of the 
whole school atmosphere and school planning was put behind religious instruc-
tion$ 23 The plaintiff asked the Court to ~prohibit all instruction in and 
teaching of religious education in public schools~ - this the Court said it 
could not do, because there are many areas of secular study which involve the 
discussion of religion - the study of the Reformation, for example.24 
Mro Justice Jackson, in a separate concurring opinion~ stated that the "relig-
ious clauses here go beyond the permissible, 1~ however, the plaintiff asks for 
more than she is entitled to, and the Court has not set standards that the 
states can follow in the futureo 25 
Justice Reed 9 the only dissenter9 a.greed with the g0neral principles set 
forth by the majority, but not with their conclusions.26 He 9 too, cited his-
tory to bolster his case - Jefferson's establishment of centers of religions 
at the University of Virginia. 27 Reed distinguished an Illinois case28 which 
struck down Bible reading and prayer as being worship services and activities 
which were "ceremonial and compulsory" - he found the practices at issue 
22Released time - children who participate are released to attend relig-
ious instructions~ others are kept in their secular classes; Dismissed time -
all children are freed from classes, those who so desire may attend religious 
instructions, the others are free to do as they wish. 
23McCollum, .QJ?Q,illo, po230. 
24Ibid., pp.234-2350 
25Ibid., p.237. 
26Ibid., p.239& 
27Ibid., p.2450 He neglected to mention that Jefferson also opposed 
religious education in the public schools - quoted in Blanchard, M•ill• p.13. 
2~y& Board of Education, 71NE2d161 (1947)., 
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nvoluntary and educationaL"29 He further warned, "This Court cannot be too 
cautious in upsetting practices imbedded in our society by many years of ex-
perience •••• The history of the past practices is determinative of the mean-
ing of a Constitutional clause."30 
The attack on the Court following the McCollum decision was only slightly 
less vehement than that which followed the more recent Engel case, according 
to one writer, this led to distinguishing the Zorach case on "gossamer thin 
grounds. 1131 The facts in the Zorach case32 were similar to those of McCollum 
with one difference which the court found signifi.canto Several New York City 
taxpayers and parents objected to that City 6 s "released time" program. Public 
school pupils with parental permission were excused from school for one hour 
a week, during school hours, to attend religious centers for religious instruc-
tion, attendance was kept and reports were sent to the school by the religious 
institution. Those who did not participate remained in the classroom, and were 
given, according to the testimony, "busy work.n33 Justice Douglas, speaking 
for the Court, in upholding the program, found that it "involves neither relig-
ious instruction in the classroom, nor expenditure of public funds" - all costs 
are paid by the religious institutions. 34 Although plaintiffs claim that the 
weight and influence of the school are put behind the program - the teachers 
police the program, classroom activities halt, and the school is used as a 
crutch for the church, 35 - Douglas disagreedQ He found no evidence of coercion; 
the public schools merely accomodated religiono It was in this context that 
29McCollum, .Q.£oCito, po253. 
30Ibid., po256o 
3lKurland, ttFull of Sound and Fury Signifying .o." .Q.£oCit., po4• 
32zorach .!.• Clausen, 343 UcS. 306, (1952). 
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his now-famous dicta was uttered, 0 We are a religious people whose institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being 0 11 36 
l<lro Justice Black~ dissenting, finds no difference between McCollum and the 
instant case - the sole question is whether New York can use its compulsory edu-
cation laws to help religious sects to get attendants presumably too unenthusi-
astic to go unless moved by the pressure of state machineryo37 Free choice is 
removed by operation of the state; the state makes religious sects the bene-
ficiaries of its power to compel children to attend secular schools.38 "In 
considering whether the state has entered this forbidden field the question is 
not whether it has entered too far~ but whether it has entered at allo 1~39 "The 
government should not under cover of the soft euphemism of 0 cooperation-1' steal 
into the sacred area of religious choice o ,AO The First Amendment has lost much 
if the religious follower and athiest alike are no longer judicially regarded 
as entitled to equal justice under lawo He implied that the Court was bowing 
to public pressure, "I am aware that our McCollum decision on separation of 
church and state has been subject to a most searching examination, ••• Prob-
ably fewer opinions in recent years have attracted more attention or stirred 
more debate."41 He added, in reply to Douglasp that because we were- a reli-
gious people that the First Amendment was adopted.42 
Jackson, in his dissent, called the distinction between McCollum .~d 
Zorach "trivial almost to the point of cynicism~ magnifying non-essential de-
tails and disparaging the compulsion which is the underlying reason for the 
statuteus invalidityott43 The truant officerw in effect, compelled attendance 
while the school served as a temporary jail for the pupils who did not wish 
36Ibid .. , p.313. 39Ibido 42Ibid.;, p.319. 
37Ibid., p .. 318g 4oibid .. , p.320. 43Ibid,,, Po325o 
38Ibid .. 41Ibid~, Po317 g• 
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to go to church,44 and Jackson admonished his "evangelistic brethren" not to 
confuse objection to compulsion with objection to religiono45 Frankfurter, in 
still a third dissent, distinguished released and dismissed timeo In the 
instant case, formalized religious instruction was substituted for other school 
activity, and there was coercion by the very nature of the system.46 He added 
that principles were disregarded, but fortunately not disavowed in this case.47 
In the same termt the Court handed down the DorelllUs decision48 in whicl1 
the Court ducked the issue which was later presented in the Schempp and Murray 
cases.. An action for declaratory judgment was brought by local taxpayers and 
the parent of a child who had graduated from the public schools in the course 
of the litigation, to interpret a New Jersey statute which read in part that 
the public schools shall hold 11no religious service •oo ezcept" the reading of 
five verses from the Old Testament (without comment) and the recitation of the 
Lord's Prayer. New Jerseyes highest court upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute and an appeal was filedo The American Civil Liberties Union and The 
American Jewish Congress filed amicus briefs on behalf of Doremus, while the 
Attorneys - General of Pennsylvania and Now York appeared for the Board of 
Educationo In a six-to-three decision, the appeal was dismissed. Justice 
Jackson, speaking for the majority, and citing Mellon Vo Frothingham49 stated 
that a taxpayer's suit must be a "pocket book" suit and since there was no show-
ing that Bible reading adds to taxes, the rule of di minimus applied. It was 
conceded that the child had graduated, therefore, no issue of damage to the 
child was raisedo It is settled law that the Supreme Court will only consider 
44Ibid., p.324e 
45Ibido 
46 
. 47 
Ibido, p.-32lo 
Ibid., p .. 3220 
4-Snoremus y. ~ .Qf. Education~ 342 U .So 429, (1952) & 
49Mellon .!,o Frothingham., 262 U .s. 447, (1923) o 
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~ "case or controversy?" which does not exist hereo50 Douglas, in a strong dis-
sent, joined by Reed and Burton, felt that the case deserved a hearing on the 
merits, "where the clash of interests is as strong as it is here, it is odd in-
deed to hold there is no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III. 
(2) of the Constitution •~o the issue is not feigned, the suit is not collusive, 
the mismanagement of the school system that is alleged is clear and plain."51 
The Court was obviously avoiding the issue, which was not finally decided until 
the Engel and Schempp cases a decade later - quite possibly for fear that the 
decision would be "wrong." 
Chapter IV 
PRAYERS AND BIBLE READING 
In 1951, the New York State Board of Regents, after considerable discuss-
ion about the extent and character of ''moral training" in the New York schools, 1 
issued a document called "Statement on Moral and Spiritual Training in the 
Schools" for the guidance of all state education officials.2 Included in this 
document was the now infamous "non-denominational" preye~ composed - after la-
borious discussion - by religious leaders of most of the denominations repre-
sented in New York, and obviously intended to offend noneo It was accompanied 
by a further statement from the Regents that "belief in and dependence upon 
Almighty God was the very cornerstone upon which our founding fathers builded." 
Theoretically, the use of this prayer was made voluntary at all levels but often 
the machinery for excusing children was vague or entirely missing. 3 The Board 
of Education of New Hyde Park, acting in its official capacity under this policy 
statement, directed the School district's principals to have said aloud by each 
class, in the presence of the teacher at the beginning of every school day, the 
following prayer: 
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy 
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our country."4 
1Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), p.422. 
2For te~t of statement, seP ~earings, pp.634-5; for an account of the relig-
ious and political struggle that preceded this document, see Boles, .QI?.•ill·, 
p.177, and Blanchard, .QI?.•fil•, pp.33-35-
3xJ1anchard, Po35· 4sngel, .QI?.•ill•, p.422. 
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Soon after this ~rayer was adopted by the School Board, ten parent-taxpayers 
brought action in the New York Courts claiming that the use of the prayer was 
contrary to their beliefs, religions, or religious practices, and that the 
action of the Regents and the School Board constituted an Establishment of re-
ligion in viola~ion of the Federal Constitution.5 Thus began the En~l case's 
long legal journey .to the United States Supreme Court. The New York Supreme 
Court (the trial Court)6 rejected the petitioner's claims, but made it clear 
that procedures and safeguards which would guarantee the plaintiffs' right of 
Free Exercise must be adoptedo This view was affirmed by the New York Court 
of Appeals in a three-two decision.7 
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Justice Black, speaking for 
an almost unanimous Court,8 summarily rejected the coutGntion of the state 
courts. "We think that by using its public school system to encourage the 
recitation of the Regents' prayer, the State of New York has adopted a prac-
tice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment clause."9 Black cited no 
cases, instead he relied on history - the history of the controversy over the 
Book of Common Prayer, and the history of the adoption of the First Amendment. 
"There can, of course, be no doubt that the daily invocation of God's blessing 
is a religious activity - the trial court so found, and the Board of Regents, 
in its amicus brief, conceded the religious nature of prayer but seeks to dis-
tinguish this p~ayer because it is based on our spiritual heritage."lO The 
fact that the prayer is "denominationally neutral'' and voluntary, does not 
5Ibid. p.423. 
6191 N.Y.S. 2d 453, (1959). 
7176 N.E. 2d. 579 (1961). 
&rhe decision was six-to-one, with neither Justices Frankfurter or White 
participating. 
9 ~' op.cit., po424. 
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"serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment clause as it might 
from the Free Exercise clause •O• .n11 "The Establishment clause, unlike the 
Free Exerci~e clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental 
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official 
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals 
or not.n12 Direct coercion, however, ts not necessary, for, when the "··· 
power, prestige, and financial support of government is placed behind a partic-
ular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities 
to conform to the prevailing officially-approved religion is plain."13 In 
short, n1t is neither irreligious or sacreligious to say that each separate 
government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sane-
tigp!!!g official prayers and leave that purely religiov.s :function to the 
people's religious leaders." (emphasis supplied)14 In a footnote that was 
frequently overlooked in the first furor over the decision, Black distinguished 
between patriotic and ceremonial exercises which contain references to the 
Deity, and the "unquestioned religious exercises which- the- State-of New York 
had sponsored in this instance. 1115 
Black confined his 1ecision to the issue of writing and sanctioning offic-
ial prayers. For Justice Douglas, concurring, "the point for decision is 
whether the government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise."16 
He was not convinced that authorizillB' the prayer is to "establish" religion in 
the strictly historical meaning of those words. A religion is not established 
in the usual sense by merely letting those who choose to do so say a prayer 
that the ptiblic school teacher leads. Yet, once a government finances a 
11Ibid., p.4300 14Ib"d 
---1...•, p~435. 
12Ibid., p.430. 15Ibid., f ootnota 21. 
l3Ibid., p.431. 16Ibid., p.437. 
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religious exercise, it inserts a divisive influence into our communities.17 In 
his sweeping concurrence, he reaffirmed his famous "we are a religious people ••• " 
dictum of Zorach, cited the dissent in McGowan18 that the government is "to have 
no interest in theology or ritual" and repudiated his stand in the Everson 
case.19 He implied that a whole series of religious involvements are unconsti-
tutional, including such diverse American "institutions" as the opening prayers 
in Congress and the Courts, tax exemptions and deductions, aid to denominational 
colleges through the G. I. Bill, etc.20 He also made it clear that he found no 
element of coercion present in the instant case (except perhaps on the teacher; 
and no teacher is complaining).21 In Douglas' view, any financial involvement 
by the government is an inconstitutional establishment. He cited the Rutl~ge­
Everson dissent as durable First Amendment philosophy - p;1blic money devoted 
to payment of religious costs, educational or other, brings quest for more. 
The lone dissenter, Mr. Justice Stewart, discounted the relevancy of the 
history cited by the majority. What was at issue to him was "not the history 
of the established church in 16th Century England or 18th Century America, but 
the history of the religious tradition of our people •••• 1122 Ina. lengthy 
footnote, he cited numerous examples of Presidents and other high officials who, 
throughout history, have invoked the aid of the Deity,23 - and concluded that 
these actions and practices do not constitute the establishment of religion.24 
There was no finding that New York had interferred with anyone's Free Exercise 
of religion (and implied that his decision would be different if there had been_ 
such a finding). 
17Ibid., p.442. 
18McGowan~. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, (1961), p.563. see appendix herein 
for summary of decision. 
19 21 ~, .Ql?.•ill•, pp.442-443. Ibid., p.438. 
20Ibid., p.440,f'ootnote 4. 22Ibid., p.446. 
23Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p.450. 
He said, 
The Court has misapplied a great constitutional principleo o•• 
I cannot see how an °official religion' is established by letting 
those who want to say a prayer, say it. On the contrary, I think 
that to deny the wish of theaa school children to join in recit-
ing this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the 
spiritual heritage of our nation.25 
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Ile did not consider whether children would "voluntarily" recite a prayer without 
the aid, assistance, and encouragement of their teachers and administrators. 
26 The last of the school Establishment cases are Schempp and Murray. 
These cases, decided together by the Court, arose in Pennsylvania and Maryland, 
respectively, under state statutes requiring Bible reading at the commencement 
of each school day. In each instance, the statutes were amended in the course 
of the litigation permitting a child's ~xcusal on parental request. The 
Scheimpps, who were Unitarians, testified :that there we1·e ''religious doctrines 
purveyed by a literal reading of the Bible which were contrary to the religious 
beliefs which they held and to their familial teaching." Schempp further testi-
fied that he did not have the children excused from attending the exercises be-
cause, among other things, he believed "tmt the children's relationships with 
their teachers and classmates would be adversely affected," that the "children 
would be labeled as 'odd-balls' ,'t and further, that children were likely to 
lump together all particular religious differences and/or objections .. as atheism, 
v!il.ch is often connected with atheistic communism.027 There was also expert 
testimony introduced in the lower court that the Bible was of great moral, 
literary, and historical value, but that there were significant differences in 
the meaning attached to various parts of the Bible by different religious 
25~., p.445. 
26Abiw,tonSchool District .!.• £:..ct_hempp, and Murray y. Curlett, decided 
together in 374 U.S. 203 (1963), herr;inafter referred to as Schempp. 
27Ibid., p.208. 
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groups, and that when read without explanation, could be psychologically harmful 
to a childQ28 The Federal District Court, where the action was brought, found 
that the reading of the verses "possesses a devotional and religious character 
and constitutes, in effect, a religious observance." In striking down the 
statute, the Court also found that the Holy Bible is a Christian-document and 
that the practice prefers the Christian religion.29 
The Maryland case was brought by Mrs. Madelyn Murray, a professed atheist, 
for her son, William, a student in the Baltimore school system. She claimed 
that the statute was in violation of their rights of "freedom of religion under 
the First and Fourteenth Amendment" in that it threatened ''their religious 
liberty by placing a premium on belief as against non-belief and subje~ted 
their freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority •••• "30 The respondentA 
demurred and the Maryland Trial Court sustained the demurrer, that is, upheld 
the validity of the statute.31 The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a four-to-
three decision, affirmed the lower court;32 the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. 
Mr. Justice Clark wrote the opininn of the Court holding that Bible read-
ing and recitation of prayer in the public schools, even though participation 
is "voluntary" constitutes an Establishment of religinn which is prohibited by 
the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth.33 He began 
28Ibid., p.209. 
29Ibid., p.210. For lower court decisions, see 177 F. Supp. 398, E.D. Pa., 
(1959); 201 F. Supp. 815, (1961). 
30Schempp • .2.R•ill•, p.212. 
3J..rhe sc}lool board, by demurring, admits all the facts pleaded by the 
petitioner - including the fact that the exercise in question is a religious 
exercise - but denies the applicability of the law. 
32Ibid., p.212, 228 Md. 239, 17~ A 2d 687, (1960). 
33Schempp • .QR.cit., p.212. 
77 
his analysis of the problem by reiterating the Zorach dicta "We are a religious 
people ••• '' and cited the numerous evidences of this in our public life; 34 how-
ever, our belief in religious .Liberty is also strong35 and re-affirmed that the 
''government is neutralp and while protecting all, it prefers none, and it dis-
parages none.••36 He went to some length to affirm the Court's position that 
the First Amendment "has been made wholly applicable to the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment,"37 and that t 1this Court has rejected unequivocally the 
contention that the Establishment clause forbids only governmental preference 
of one religion over another.~ This was settled in the Cantwell case,38 and 
re-affirmed in Everson (both by the majority and the dissenters), in McCollum, 
in Zora.ch, in ]foGowan Y.• Maryland, Torasco .Y! Watkins39 and Engel. He explained 
his reiteration of these well-established principles by s~ying, 
"While ncne of the parties to P.ither of these cases has questioned 
these basic conclusions of the Court, ••• others continue to question 
their history, logic, and efficiency. Such contentions, in the light 
of the consistent interpretations in cases of this Court seem entirely 
un-tenable and of value only as academic exercises. 0 40 
He further re-affirmed the inter-relationship and duality of the religious 
clauses of the First Amendment. The Establishment clause has been considered 
by the Court eight times and it has consistently held that the "clause withdrow 
all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereor. 1141 
34 - 35 Ibid., p.213. .ill<!•, p.214. 
36Ibid .. , p.215. Originally quoted in an Ohio case by Judge Alonzo Taft, 
father of Chief Justice Taft. 
37Ibid., p.216 .. This is the first time the Court has :found it necessary 
to mention incorporation. 
38Ibid., p.215, referring to Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 UeS. 296, (1940). 
39367 u.s. 488, (1961). Bee appendix herein. 
40Schempp • .Q.:eocit., p.117. (The Justices ~ sensitive to public opinion!) 
41Ibid., p.222. 
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The test is "what are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If 
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion, then the enactment ex-
ceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution ... 
To withstand the strictures of the Establishment clause, there must be secular 
legislative purpose and primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits re-
ligion. The Free Exercise clause withdraws from legislative power the-exertion 
of any restraint on the free exercise of religion.42 
In applying the law to the instant facts, Justice Clark found that the 
religious character of the exercise was admitted by the State by its ruling 
that the Douay version of the Bible may be used and that pupils may be excused 
even though the State contended that part of its secular purpose was the pro-
motion of moral values to counteract the materialistic trends of our times, etc. 
The conclusion followed that in both cases, the laws required religious exer-
cises and such exercises were being conducted in direct violation of petitioners' 
rights.43 He made it quite clear that a study of the Bible, or of religion, 
objectively presented as part of a program of secular education, does not fall 
within this prohibition. He further emphasized that "while the Free Exercise 
clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free 
exercise to anyone, it never meant that a majority could use the machinery of 
the State to practice its beliefs" - citing Justice Jackson in the Barnette 
case. The very purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach 
of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be 
applied by the Courts. 
Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, agreed that the state could not 
conduct a religious exercise without violating the neutrality required of the 
42Ibid. 
-
43Ibid., p.223. 
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State.44 But, further, in a -position similar to his stand in Engel, he said 
the Establishment clause also forbids the State ttto employ its f'i1~ilities or 
funds in a way that gives any church or all churches greater strength in our 
society than it would have by relying on its members alone." Through the 
mechanism of the state, all of the people were required to finance a religious 
exercise that only some of the people wanted and that violated the sensibilities 
of others; this violated the First Amendment - it is not the amount of the funds 
expended, he said, but the use to which they are put.45 
Mr .. Justice Brennan, setting forth .tµ.s views in a separate opinion, joined 
fully in the opinion and judgment of the Court. In a scholarly, detailed, and 
thoughtful presentation, Brennan analysed the whole problem of church-state 
relationships. Referring to the },ounding Fathers, and pat'ticularly to Madison 
and Jefferson, he reached the crux of the problem when he stated, 
I doubt if their view, even if perfectly clear one way or the other, 
would supply a dispositive answer to the question presented by these 
cases. A more fruitful inquiry, it ~~ems to me, is whether the 
practices here challenge or threaten those consequences which the 
Framers deeply feared; whether, in short, they tend to promote th.at 
type of interdependence between religion and state which the First 
Amendment was designed to prevent.46 
A literal quest for the intent of the Founding Fathers is futile because: 
1. the historical record is ambiguous, 2. the structure of /.merican education 
has greatly changed since the adoption of the First Amendment, 3. our religious 
composition makes us vastly more diverse people than our forefathers were, and 
4. the American experiment in free public education available to all children 
has been guided in large measure by the dramatic evolution of religious· diver-
sities among the population which the public schools se:~e. 47 
In reviewing the history of the Court's decisions Ln important State -
44Ibid., p.229. 
45Ibid. 
46Ibid., pp.235-6. 
47Ibid., pp.236-2400 
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Religion cases, Brennan finds that the distinctions between the Hamilton48 and 
Barnette cases crucial to the resolution of the present cases - Hamilton dealt 
with the voluntary attendance at college of young adults, while Barnette in-
volved the compulsory attendance of young children at elementary and secondary 
schools.49 A discussion of the absorption of the Establishment clause into the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Blaine Amendment led the Justice into a discus-
sion of the duality of the Religion clauses of the First Amendment, and a re-
view of the three cases discussed above which led to the present case. He 
cited the language of the Everson case, carefully pointing out that four of 
the Justices disagreed with the result of the case.50 He rejected the con-
tention that Zorach overruled McCollum in silence, and also noted that they 
were not distinguishable in terms of Free Exercise. The crucial difference 
was that McCollum offended the Establishment clause while Zorach did not -
not because of the public funds which were involved, but rather because the 
McCollum program placed the religious instructor in the public school class-
room in precisely the position of authority held by the regular teachers of 
secular subjects. "A request from one in authority is understood to be mere 
euphemism; it is in fact, a command in an inoffensive form ... 5l 
The Sunday Law cases, Brennan said, considered the contention that 
establishing a uniform day of rest was a violation of the Establishment Clause, 
but found that although the purpose was originally a religious one, these laws 
~lton .Y• Regents of University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934). 
Action brought by conscientious objectors. Issue was whether State could 
compel students at State University to participate in military training-
instruction against their religious convictions. Held: compulsory military 
training at State University did not violate the right of Free Exercise since 
there is neither a constitutional right nor legal obligation to attend the 
State University. 
49schempp, op.cit., p.252. 50Ibid., p.260. 51Ibid., p.263. 
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were continued in force for reasons wholly secular,52 and were enforced for 
wholly secular objectives which could not be effectively achieved in a modern 
society except by designating Sunday a uniform day of rest. In the Torasco 
case, on the other band, although Free Exercise rather than Establishment was 
involved, the state attempted to use a religious means for achieving a purely 
secular goal; the states' interest in the integrity of its Notary Publics did 
not warrant the screening of applicants by a religious testo Botn cases, there-
fore, stand for the proposition that government may not use religious means to 
serve secular interests without the clearest demonstration that non-religious 
means will not suffice. Like the prayer in Engel, these exercises are clearly 
religious, and, unlike the Sunday closing laws, they have not lost their relig-
ious purpose or religious character by the passage of time.53 
Although Brennan could well have stopped at this point, he felt it nec-
essary to discuss three other contentions which bad been raised in the case 
and deserved the Court's attention. The first argument raised was that the 
purpose of the exercise was clearly secular; moral and spiritual values were 
taught and a solemn exercise inspired better discipline. "To the extent that 
only religious materials will serve this purpose, it seems to me that the pur-
pose, as well as the means is plainly religious, that the exercise is neces-
sarily forbidden by"the Establishment clause."54 The second argument that 
Brennan refuted was that the practices involved were unobjectionable because 
they preferred no sect at the expense of the others - in fact, the practices 
did pref er some sects over the others - there are too many different views on 
how the Bible, which is a sectarian book, should be read and studied; and "even 
if the Establishment clause were oblivious to non-sectarian religious prac-
tices, I think it quite likely that the 'common core' approach would be 
53Ibid., p.278. 
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sufficiently objectionable to many groups to be foreclosed by the prohibitions 
of the Free Exercise clause." The third element to be considered was that pro-
visions for excusal were made. Once it was found that these practices were 
essentially religious, the availability of excusal or exemption had no relevance 
to the Establishment question; further, the excusal procedures necessarily 
operated in such a way as to violate the right of Free Exercise by requiring, 
in effect, a profession of disbelier.55 Brennan cited extensive studies of 
behavioral scientists concerning the effect of similar situations upon chil-
dreno56 The final contention of the school officials that the Court, by inval-
idating these exercises, would have to declare eve-ry vestige of cooperation be-
tween religion and government unconstitutional, he rejected summarily. 
nReligious exercises in the schools present a unique problem. For not every 
involvement of religion in life violates the Establishment clause." The test 
of what is forbidden under the Establishment clause is those involvements with 
secular institutions which (a) serve essentially religious activities of reli-
gious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially reli-
gious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental 
aims where secular means would suffice.57 
After making it very clear that the practices complained of in the instant 
case violated the Establishment clause, Justice Brennan explained in some de-
tail the forms of accomodation between government and religion which showed 
government neutrality and not hostility to religion.58 A. Where there is a 
conflict between Establishment and Free Exercise; for example, when the govern-
ment has deprived individuals of their right of Free Exercise, such as in penal 
institutions or military installations, the government may provide chaplains 
55Ibid., p.288. 
56Ibid., 
57Ibid., po295. 
58Ibid., p .. 298. 
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without violating the Establishment clause. Therefore, this is distinguishable 
from sponsoring daily prayer and Bible reading in elementary and secondary 
schools in that, in the former situation, there is no element of coercion pres-
ent and involves adults, not children.59 B. Devotional exercises in Legislative 
bodies - again dealing with mature adults, 60 he added that this could well be a 
"political question" since the Constitution makes each House monitor of its own 
Rules.61 C. The non-devotional use of the Bible in public schools is certainly 
not foreclosed by the decision - nor are the propriety of tax exemptions or 
deductions which incidentally benefit the religious institutions in question; 
nor are religious considerations in public welfare programs, and/or activities 
which although originally religious in origin, have lost their religious sig-
nificance. 62 This latter point would, in the Justice's opinion, serve to insu-
late from the application of the First Amendment such things as "In God We 
Trust•• and patriotic exercises which invoke the name of the Deity. 63 
Mr. Justice Goldberg, with Mr. Justice Harlan, submitted still another 
concurring opinion. They, too, joined completely in the opinion and judgement 
of the Court, but added a caveat; the two parts of the First Amendment are to 
be read together in the light of the single purpose they are designed to serve -
the promotion and assurance of the fullest possible scope of religious liberty 
and tolerance for all, and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope 
of attainment of that end~64 Not all involvements of government and religion 
are prohibited; there are required and permissible accomodations between 
government and religion - the Schempp case does not fall within such permissible 
59 Ibid., p.299. 60 Ibid., po300. 
61Ibid., p.301. This issue could only be raised by a member of Congress, 
quite unlikely if the Congressman expected to be re-elected. 
62Ibid., p.301, et.seq. 63J.Qii. 64Ibid., p.305. 
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accommodation. The state has organized its facilities to engage in an unmis-
takable religious practice, during the curricular day, involving young impres-
sionable children, whose attendance is compelled; and has utilized the pres-
tige, power, and influence of the school administration staff and authority -
this is not simply an accommodation.65 This, he said, is the holding of the 
Court, and no more. Practices which. do not create any of the dangers the 
Amendment is designed to prevent, and do not involve the state in religious 
exercises, are not prohibited; 66 each case will be decided individually -
"the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness to 
distinguish between real threat and mere shadow. 1167 
Mr. Justice Stewai-t, the lone dissenter, would have remanded the cases 
for the taking of additional evidence, before he could judge whether the 
Establishment clause had necessarily been violated (he commented parenthet-
ically that neither of the complainants raised the issue of Establishment, 
b~t rather alleged violations of their religious liberty).68 Historically, the 
church and state interact in numerous ways, and, although in many cases the two 
clauses in the First Amendment complement each other, there are areas where a 
doctrinaire reading of the Establishment clause would be in irreconcilable 
conflict with the Free Exercise clause.69 It is, in his view, a fallacious 
oversimplification of the meaning of the First Amendment to regard them as a 
single constitutional standard of' "separation of' church and state." Stewart 
felt that there was a substantial Free Exercise claim on the part of those who 
affirmatively desire to have their children's school day open with passages 
from the Bible;70 compulsory state schooling structures a child's life so that 
he does not get religion in school, Stewart said, religion, therefore, is 
65Ibid., p.305. 
66Ibid., p.306. 
67Ibid., p.306. 
68Ibid., p.309. 
69Ibid., p.309. 
?Oibid., p.312. 
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placed at a disadvantage.71 He also raised a point of judicial construction 
which had not been mentioned in some time in connection with Bill of Rights 
oases - that is that the Court is "under a duty to interpret these provisions 
so as to render them constitutional if reasonably possible.n72 Without coercion 
on the part of pupils to participate, there is no establishment, according to 
Stewart.* 
... 
71Ibid. 
72Ibid., p.316 • 
The cases reviewed above are the principal cases involving the schools 
and religion. There are several other recent occasions in which the Court 
further discusses the religion clauses that are significant in any study of 
this subject. They are briefly reviewed in the Appendix herein. 
Chapter V 
LEARNED CRITICS 
The problems which have confronted the Court in these cases are not only 
constitutional and philosophical, but alsQ highly emotional and controversial. 
The comments of prominent writers in the field are illustrative of tJie complex-
ity and diversity of' opinion with which_the Court is faced. "'There are two con-
flicting theories regarding the interpretation of the religion clauses of the 
First Amendment which several Justices seem to have taken into account, but 
have not clearly articulated. Many writers have also considered this conflict 
but have not been able to express it definitively. Edmund Cahn of New York 
University School of Law refers to the two views as the Jeffersonian -
Enlightenment view and the Madisonian - Dissenter view.1 Under the Jefferson-
ian,' or "narrow" view, the Establishment clause has no vitality of its own, but 
exists merely to implement the .Free Exercise clause, while under the Madison-
ian, or "broad" view, Establishment not only implements Free Exercise but also 
is a self-sufficient imperative "meriting the most scrupulous obedience because 
it safeguards the purity of organized religion itself •112 In other words, it 
represents the right of organized religion to be independent of the state and of 
the state to be independent of organized religion. 
10Misunderstanding of the.Establishment Clause," 36 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1277. 
(1961). His exact reasons for assigning these names escape this writer, but 
they do serve as convenient "handles." 
2Ibid., p.1278., 
Under the first view, an Establishment exists when any act of government 
iilterferee or abridges in any way the free exercise of an individual's reli-
gious beliefs - but the element of interference with Free Exercise must be 
present. This seems to be the approach taken by the dissent in both Engel and 
Schempp. Following this theory, prayers in schools, and non-discriminatory and 
impartial aid, financial or otherwise, to all religious institutions would be 
constitutional. Under the second theory, ~involvement of government in 
religious activity would constitute Establishment and come within the prohibi-
tion of the First Amendment. This would be true whether the involvement came 
through taxation or by virtue of the power and prestige of government, and 
whether or not it interfered with Free Exercise. This view, carried to its 
logical conclusion, would not only prohibit tax aid to religious institutions, 
but also tax exemptions, and probably such things as ttin God We Trust" on coins, 
"under God11 in the flag salute, etc. Professor Wilber G. Katz3 would add a 
third interpretation of the First Amendment, which he refers to as the princi-
ple of neutrality, and which he summarizes as "no help unless no help would 
be harm."4 In other words, a State cannot be actively hostile towards reli-
gion, but rather be benevolently neutral in religious matters. This is a 
middle ground which would prohibit direct aid to any religious institution, 
but would not interfere with the present tax structure and references to the 
Deity in public life. 
The Court has not espoused any of these views completely, although the 
language of the cases, if not the decisions themselves, would bring them 
closer to the positio~ of neutrality suggested by Professor Katz. The learned 
3Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin, former Dean, University of 
Chicago School of Law, statement and testimony before Judiciary Committee, 
Hearings, pp.813-819. 
4Ibid., p.818. 
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critics are divided in their opinions along these same lines. They cite the 
Founding Fathers, particularly Madison and Jefferson; they discuss the various 
meanings of .. religion," "sectarian, .. and "church,u and no one has had diffi-
cul ty finding convincing authority to support his particular stand. The charge 
of being "result-oriented" is often leveled at the Court - in this subject it 
could well be leveled at the critics; their dissatisfactio~ is aimed at the de-
cision rather than the reasons. In reading the many Law Review Articles, books, 
and magazine articles, one gains the impression that each writer had a pre-
conceived idea of what the result should be and then supported it. This is most 
understandable, for the subject of religion is very personal, very emotional, 
and not necessarily rational - it can be quite difficult to divorce one's preju-
dices from an objective study of what the "law'' is, and what it should be. The 
Writers do agree, however, that the cases taken as a whole offer no real pattern 
or guide for the future. 
Cahn is probably the most articulate exponent of the Madisonian - Dissenter 
view5 based on philosophical, ethical, moral, and historical grounds. The First 
.Amendment calls for a complete separation of church and state. In light of the 
background, the Engel decision was as predictable as the judicial process ever 
can be.6 The decision was almost unanimous as compared to the school bus case 
and the Sunday closing laws, because the subject matter was purely religious 
and uncomplicated by questions of economics or public safety; he agrees, too, 
that the idea of a non-denominational prayer is fallacious - that the express-
ion is a contradiction in terms. Many other constitutional scholars agree with 
Cahn. For example, Louis Pollack states, "By placing the decision on the 
5Ed.mund Cahn, "On Government and Prayer," 37 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 981, (1962). 
6 12!!!·, p.986. 
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Establishment clause, the court evidenced a high order of responsibility. 117 
This reflects the Everson view set forth by Rutledge, which he feels will 
ultimately prevail~8 "By design, the religious freedom clauses were designed 
to protect minority religious groups and non-believers from the majority. 119 
Philip Kurland10 agrees that "establishment" does not rest on compulsion, but 
questions the majority's reliance on history (since no cases were cited) be-
cause he argues that historical arguments are not really valid unless it is 
assumed that 0 due process" is static.11 Leo Pfeffe; (counsel for the .American-
Jewish Congress, and for the plaintiffs in several of the above cases) also 
takes the view that there "is a distinction in conceptual foundation of the two 
clauses" that practical as well as ideological considerations were involved in 
creating a complete separation of church and state.12 
Many critics take the other view - (one is reminded of the parable of the 
elephant and the three blind men - each man found what he waslooking for!). It 
is interesting, but not too surprising, that the articles in the Catholic Law 
Reviews generally adopt the narrower interpretation of the religion clauses of 
7Louis H. Pollack, "Public Prayers in Public Schools," 77 Harv. L.R. 62, 
(1963). p.70. 
8Louis H. Pollack, 0 W.B.R. Some Reflections," 71 Yale L.R. 1451,(1961), 
p. 1456. 
9Harry N. Rosenfeld, "Separation of Church and State in Public Schools," 
22 U. of Pitto L.R. 561, (1960), p.562. An excellent article which objectively 
reviews the history of church-state relationships in the courts, the purpose 
of the First in the light of our history, and concludes that complete separation 
is called for. 
lOh Supreme ~ Reyiew, Philip Kurland, ed.; Chicago, U. of Chic. Press, 
( 1962) • The Regents' Prayer Case; "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying ••• " p. 3. 
11Ibid., p.22. 
12Leo Pfeffer and F. X. O'Neill, "The Meaning of the Establishment Clause -
A Debate," 2 Buf. L .. R. 225, (1953), p.228. See also Pfeffer, "Court, Constitu-
tion, and Prayer," 16 Rutgers L.R. 735, (1962). 
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the First Amendment.13 It is even more interesting that those who support the 
"broad" view make the point that the Bible is a sectarian book, and that there 
is no such thing as a non-sectarian prayer. This point seems to have been 
"overlooked~ by the proponents of the "narrow" view. 
Paul G. Kauper, of the University of Michigan Law Schoo1,14 applauds the 
narrowness of the Engel decision, asserting that the case does not outlaw 
' 
prayer. (This same point was emphasized by others although it should have been 
obvious that the prayer was "outlawed" because it was a religious and devotional 
exercise.) He agrees with the New York Court of Appeals' decision that the 
Regent's prayer was permissible as long as those objecting were protected, and 
cites with approval the Chief Justice of that court that "'it is a fundamental 
rule of interpretation that the sense of the nation at the time of the adoption' 
of the amendment be taken into accollll.t, and that 'prayer is an integral part of 
our national heritage'".l5 Kauper further states that non-discriminatory fi-
nancial aid to parochial schools would be constitutional, since the government 
can and does impose educational standards on them. Charles B. Nutting16 agrees, 
but does not feel that the Court will accept this view in light of the Engel 
case. This distresses him because "it is clear that originally in the American 
Colonies religion was a matter of government concern" and that "the encourage-
ment and strengthening of religion through government action is a part of the 
cultural heritage of this country.n (!)17 
Still a third school of thought would have had the Court duck the issue in 
l3See 31 Ford. L.Revo 201, (1962); 31 Geo. Wash. L.R. 497, (1962); 
11 Loyola L.R. 358, (1962-3); 46 Marq. L.R. 233, (1962-3), 
l4t1Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court," 61 Mich. L .. R. 1031,(1963). 
15Ibid., p.1034. 
160some Reflections on the Positive State," 49 Va. L.R. 729, p.733,(1963). 
17Ibid., P• 736. 
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one way or another. One writer, comparing the American Federal system to that 
of Switzerland,18 sees the problem as one of federalism, and suggests that the 
Establishment clause should not be incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment 
and that the Court has done so without reference to Cardozo's "ordered 
liberty.1t19 Establishment does not define an individual freedom, O'Brian says, 
but was merely intended to be a restriction on the Central government; estab-
lishment can exist without infringing on religious liberty, in fact, religious 
coercion has not occurred in America.20 Arthur Sutherland of Harvard,21 one of 
the few authorities who feels that the court arrived at the right result for the 
wrong reasons, would have preferred that the case have been decided on the basis 
of available precedent, that is, on Free Exercise. The new approach under 
Establishment opens the door and obliges the court to pass on the validity of 
comparatively insignificant manifestations of religious activity in public 
education. He would advise the Court to exercise judicial restraint - in fact, 
the Court should have refused the suit on the grounds of di minimus - (cer-
tainly one might apply the doctrine of 9&,minimus to some religious expressions 
in public schools, but it would seem to this student that an activity which is 
repeated daily becomes more of a mountain than a molehill), and he advocates 
the same restraint on the part of other governmental bodies, including school 
boards. Dean Erwin Griswold22 cites his colleague with approval. He feels 
18Fr. William O'Brian, "The Engel Case From A Swiss Perspective," 61 Mich. 
L.R. 1069, (1963). 
19Ibid., 1083. 
20Ibid., p.1083, footnote #75. but see Boles, ll•ill•, p.177; Blanchard, 
.QJ?.cit., p.33; Hearings, op.cit., pp. 2036, 1060, 447, etc. 
21ttEstablishment According to Engel," 76 Harv. L.R. 25, (1962). 
22Erwin N. Griswold, 0 Absolute is in the Dark - A Discussion of the Approach 
of the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions," 8 Utah L.R. 167 (1963) cited in 
Hearings, p.1017. 
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that this was a local matter which the court should not have considered. In 
accordance with the Barnette decision, as long as participation is voluntary, 
a non-believer can refrain. He disagrees with.the social scientists who assert 
that the school situation creates compulsion - as a matter of fact, the dis-
believer is different, and might as well get used to being so considered. 
Others defining religion narrowly, argue that it was the intent of the 
Framers to place all religions on an equal footing, that "Establishment" . 
simply means that there be no national church.23 Still others believe that 
in using the historical approach, the Court did not take into account the under-
lying policy of the Establishment clause - which is to eliminate divisiveness -
and that the exact meaning will depend on the circumstances since what is 
divisive in one situation will not be in another.24 Wilber Katz takes the 
position that religion is only free when it is free of coerced support as well 
as coercive restrictions, and that strict separation actually reduces the area 
of religious freedom. 25 He feels that the reason for the involvement of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and other such organizations, despite the result-
ing restraint of religious liberty, is fear of the Roman Catholic Church as a 
threat to potential religious freedom, since a Catholic state would not permit 
26 dissenting groups to carry on general propaganda. 
A unique and most intelligent approach to the problem of the meaning of 
Establishment was presented in the Tulane Law Review in 1963. It analyzed 
those activities which are nearly universal in countries which do have an 
23James F. Janz, "Church and State; Prayer in Public Schools," 46 Marq. 
L.R. 234, (1962). · 
24student note, 16 Vand. L.R. 205, (1963). 
25Wilber Katz, "Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality," 20 U. of Chi. 
L.R. 426, p.433, (1953). 
26 ~., p.436. 
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established church.27 Where there is an established church, t4e government 
1. Prescribes prayers and forms of worship. 
2. Exercises some control over the appointment of church officers. 
3. Requires religious instructions in public schools. 
4. Pays the salary of clergy or otherwise subsidizes church. 
5. Requires the chief of state or others to profess a certain faith.28 
In the United States, there has been controversy over all but the second! The 
argument that prayer in the schools is based on our spiritual heritage is 
probably the most damaging one that can be made because the "preservation and 
use of national spiritual heritage is the raison d'etre for the establishment 
of state churches." The First Amendment goes further than merely prohibiting 
the establishment of a church - it provides there is to be no establishment of 
religion, thus effectively removing it from the political domain. 
The Court has not espoused any of these views completely, although the 
language of the Establishment cases, if not the decisions themselves, would 
bring the majority of the Court close to the position of benevolent neutrality 
suggested by Professor Katz, with Justice Stewart adopting the narrow position 
that interference with Free Exercise must be shown, and Douglas embracing the 
strict separation. 
27student note,37 Tul- L.R.124, (1963), p.127. 
28Ibid. 
Chapter IV 
PROGNOSIS 
Predicting the Court, like ranking the Presidents, has long been a favorite 
sport of political scientists - professionals and amateurs alike. This writer, 
too, has succumbed to the lure of the game. The critics of the Court seem to 
agree that the Court has not set forth guidelines for the future because the 
Court has not clearly defined Establishment. Despite the apparent lack of a 
definition, I feel the Court has indicated the course it will follow. The 
Court, after all, rarely draws a blueprint, but traditionally decides issues on 
a case by case basis, each decision building on the preceeding one. 
It is clear from the five principal cases discussed herein - and from the 
Jehovah's Witnesses cases - that Free Exercise is the right to practice or not 
to practice one's religion without interference from government. The Court 
indicates that there is a difference between Free Exercise and Establishment, 
but has not spelled out that difference. The cases discussed herein represent 
the two sides of the freedom of religion coin - the Everson case involving 
public tax support of religious schools, and the others involving religious 
activity in tax-supported public schools; the decisions in all five were based 
on the Establishment clause. There was no Establishment found in Everson be-
cause the spending of tax funds to provide buses for parochial school pupils 
served a public purpose which only incidentally benefited the religious insti-
tutions. In McCollum and Zorach, both involving released time, the existence 
of Establishment was determined by the use of tax funds to support religious 
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activity; on-premises released time was held to be such a use of tax funds as to 
constitute Establishment, while off-premises released time was not an Establish-
ment because it did not involve the use of tax funds. In Engel and Schempp, the 
Regents• prayer, Bible reading, and the recitation of the Lord's prayer - all 
clearly religious activities - were held to constitute an Establishment because 
they were conducted on a systematic basis, on public school property, and spon-
sored by public school authorities. The use of tax funds to support a relig-
ious activity, the use of public property and public authority to support or 
promote a religious activity; these, at the very least, constitute Establishment. 
In the last four of these cases, the issue of Free :b"'xer.cise was also raised 
by plaintiffs, but in each case Free Exercise was considered irrelevant and 
immaterial and the Establishment clause controlling. Dicta would indicate that 
where the Court finds Establishment, it is not necessary to.prove that the right 
to Free Exercise has been abridged.1 However, the majority in each of these 
cases indicates that the school situation itself creates a compulsion which 
does abridge the right of Free Exercise, even though participation is "volun-
tary. "2 It is this point which separates the majority from the minority. The 
dissenters in each case agree that if there were proof of actual coercion on 
the pupils to participate, there would be an unconstitutional activity. The 
minority demands proof; the majority in effect takes "judicial notice•• of the 
compulsory nature of the school situation. 
1see Black, ~, -2.R•.ill.•, p.430; Brennan, Schempp, _Q,R.ci t., p.298; 
the dissent in Zorach, -2.R•sit·• p.320; and the majority in_McCollum, .QR.cit., 
pp.227,230. 
21 remember rather vividly from my grammar school days in Pennsylvania, 
the taunts and teasing inflicted on a classmate who was a member of Jehovah's 
Witnesses, and refused to salute the flag. Despite the compulsory flag-salute 
law (this was pre-Barnette), the teacher permitted this student to remain 
seated - but the other children never for a moment let her forget that she 
was diffeJ"ent, and odd. 
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It would appear that the difference between the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment clauses is that the former involves negative or reetaining action on 
religion or religious beliefs, while the latter involves positive support of 
religion. Government attempts to interfere with an individual's beliefs would 
be a violation of Free Exercise; government promotion of a particular set of 
beliefs (i.e. religion as opposed to non-religion) would violate the Establish-
ment clause. Although it is somewhat of an over-simplification, it would not 
be inaccurate to say that Free Exercise tends to protect the "b<>liever," no 
matter how odd his beliefs may be, and Establishment tends to protect the "non-
believer," whether it be non-belief in religion in general or in a particular 
religion. The question then remains, is there an attempt to put the weight and 
authority of the government behind the support of religiont or posed in another 
way, who is sufficiently "injured" to have standing to sue? 
/Theoretically, Establishment can stand alone, without coercion; however, 
where there is no showing that the plaintiff personally has been injured, there 
is no way to attack such a practice. In those instances in wlrl.ch the plaintiff 
can show that he has been injured by an activity of the government, the Court 
is likely to find Establishment where a religious activity is at issue - of 
course, by showing injury, plaintiff also shows that his right of Free Exercise 
has been violated. For example, if the Hamilton case3 were decided today, the 
Court would probably hold that plaintiff could not be denied the right to attend 
the state university because of his religious conviction and, therefore, com-
pulsory military training would be a violation of plaintiff's right of Free 
Exercise, and unconstitutional as to him. Compulsory chapel attendance at a 
state university would undoubtedly be held to be an Establishment, and conse-
quently, a prohibited activity; in order to have a standing to sue, however, 
3see p.80 herein. 
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plaintiff would have to show that his beliefs were violated - his right to Free 
Exercise was abridgedo On the other handp non-compulsory chapel at a government 
supported university could not be challenged because no one is injured suffi-
ciently to have a standing to sue. Many practices which might be considered 
Establishment are simply immune from attack under the Mellon _ y._Massachusetts 
doctrine. 
As a practical matter, the Supreme Court has settled the issue of religious 
activity in public life. Despite widespread predictions that the Justices would 
prohibit the singing of "America" by students; remove "In God WA·Trust11 from 
coins; and ban the daily invocations in Congress, the Oourt has not done so.4 
The Court refused to review a decision of the New York Court of Appeals, hold-
ing that the inclusion of the words 11Under God.. in the pledge of allegiance did 
not constitute an Establishment,5 and also refused to review another New York 
decision in which the United States Court of .t\ppeals ruled that school officials 
had the power to ban "voluntary" prayers in public nursery schools.6 
The other side of the coin, actual tax support for religious institutions, 
presents a much more difficult problem to the Court... There are two facets to 
this problem; 1) tax exemptions to religious institutions, and 2) outright tax 
aid to such institutions, the latter by far the most troublesome. On October 10, 
1966, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a Maryland case7 brought by 
4For a comprehensive list of the "religious" activities of the government, 
see Justice Douglas, concurring opinion, Schempp, .QJ? • .ei!,., p.440, footnote 4. 
5Lewis v. Allen, Commissioner of Education of New York, 379 U.S. 923 
(1964), cert-:- denied. 
6New IQE]£ ~. July 8, 1965, p.33 _U.S._ (1965) concerning the 
children's grace "God is great, God is good," etc., said before juice and 
cookies. 
7Murray .I• Controller JU: .1Wl Treasury #133, _ U .s. _ 17 L ed 2d 55 
(1966). 
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Mrs. Madalyn Murray O'Hare - the plaintiff in the Maryland Bible reading case -
who contended that tax exemptions for houses and buildings "used exclusively for 
public worship" amounted to an indirect subsidy to religious institutions, and 
was, therefore, a violation of the Establishment clause. Plaintiffs claimed 
that as taxpayers they were forced unfairly to pa.y a larger share of the taxes 
because churches which used public services failed to pa.y their share of the 
cost. The lower court held that the plaintif'fs - atheists - had standing to 
sue, but dismissed the action on the merits. The Maryland Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court, saying that such "time-honored" exemptions are not 
an Establishment. To the extent that religious property is exempt, there may 
be an indirect subsidy, but in Maryland sixty other types of charities also 
have exemptions, and the major part of church work is charitable.8 
The Court's refusal to review the case does not necessarily mean that the 
Justices agree that such exemptions are constitutional, but, merely that for 
its own reasons, it did not see fit to review the matter. The Court will prob-
ably maintain this position until it is "forced" by a conflict in the circuits, 
to consider the question.9 Should the matter come before the Court, the Court 
could duck the issue by holding under the Mellon doctrine, that the interest of 
any single taxpayer was so nominal that no one had standing to sue. Such a de-
cision would apply only to federal taxes, and allow state court decisions as to 
state taxes to stand. Should the Court decide the issue on the merits, it seems 
likely that the tax exemptions would be upheld on the grounds that, 1) to refuse 
exemptions to churches while granting to all other charitable, eleemosynary, 
and educational institutions would be showing hostility to religion rather than 
C\turray x_ .. Comptroller~~ Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A. 2d 897 (1966). 
9For a list of exemptions granted by the Federal government, see testimony 
of Congressman Derounian, Hearings, .Qll•.ill•, p.644. 
99 
neutrality, 2) refusal to grant an exemption would be a violation of 0 equal pro-
tection of the laws," and 3) since there is no coercion or support of a partic-
ular set of beliefs, no Establishment exists. 
Tax grants to religious schools - at all levels - will present the Court 
with its most difficult problem in this area. The provisions of the Aid to 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 will undoubtedly provide the 
vehicle for testing this issue. This bill, a compromise care:f'ully tailored to 
avoid the church-state issue, provides - instead of general aid to elementary 
and secondary schools for teachers' salaries and building construction, (which 
probably would have been stalled by those advocating aid to parochial and pri-
vate schools) for shared time, community oriented educational programs, such as 
remedial reading and pre-school programs, and grants for purchase of educational 
and instructional materialso Many Congressmen, for reasons political or other-
wise, have questioned the constitutionality of this bill; however, an amend-
ment, 10 proposed by Senator Samuel Ervin of North Carolina, allowing a federal 
taxpayer's suit (to overcome the Mellon case~ minimus ruling) was defeated by 
a coalition of Northern Democrats and liberal Republicans. It can be tested, 
however, on a provision which allows the states to sue the Commissioner of 
Education for withholding funds, or through the State courts. How it will be 
tested is not certain, but that it will be tested, there is no question. 
The final decision of the Court in this matter will no doubt rest on the 
Everson case - either the decision itself, relying on the child-benefit theory, 
or on the language of the case which erected the "wall of separation" between 
church and state. In this area, the facts are all important, the way the case 
is presented will be controlling. It is the ,.child-benefit" theory on which 
the Federal Aid to Education Bill was predicated. As Justice Rutledge pointed 
1<\iew York Times, April 10, 1965, p.l. 
---
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out in his Everson dissent,11 the claim that support is to education and not 
religion because education is a public function does not deny that both the 
individual and the school are benefited directly and substantially. 
Th.is approach, if valid, supplies a ready method for nullifying 
~ne Amendment's guaranty, ••• the only thing needed is for the 
Court to transplant 'public welfare - public function• view from 
its proper non-religious due process bearing to First Amendment 
applicationol2 
Congressional findings of the public purpose to be served by giving every child 
a good education will be persuasive, and if, to paraphrase the minority in 
Everson, there is no religious test used in selecting the recipients of public 
funds, this may be controlling as to certain parts of the Bill. For example, 
after-school community centers for remedial reading would appear to have no 
connection with the religious institution which the child may attend during 
school hours. 
On the other hand, grants for text-books, and other materials actually 
used in the parochial schools would seem to be such use of tax funds which 
would constitute an Establishment. In this instance, as Mr. Justice Goldberg 
said in the Schempp case, each case will be decided individually on its facts, 
for, "the measure of constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness 
to distinguish between real threat and mere shadow."13 In deciding on a case 
by case basis, the Court might well follow another recent Maryland Court of 
Appeals decision14 which involved state grants to four church-affiliated 
colleges. 
11Everson, .QJ?o,illo, pp.56-58. 
12Ibid. 
13schempp, .QJ?•ill•, p.306. 
14norace ~ League of the United States of America, Inc • .!.• Board of 
Public Works .Q! Ma:tyland, 242 Md. 645, 220 A 2d. 51 (1966). . 
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The Horace Mann League of the United States challenged state grants for 
buildings to four church affiliated colleges; the trial court upheld all the 
grants, holding that their basic purpose and effect was secular and not relig-
ious. The Maryland Court of Appeals, in a four-three decision, reversed as to 
three of the colleges.15 The grant to the fourth college, Hood, affiliated 
with the United Church of Christ, was upheld because "we are unable to say that 
the college is sectarian in the legal sense,~16 and went on to say that nthe 
matter of what is sectarian is rather elusive, being somewhat ephemeral in 
nature." The Court cited Douglas' dictum that the most effective way to estab-
lish an institution is to finance it, used the language of Everson to say that 
tax funds cannot be used to support an institution which teaches the tenets and 
faith of any church, nor can an individual be excluded :from the benefits of 
valid public welfare legislation because of his faith or lack of it;17 and the 
Brennan language of Sdlempp "if a statute furthers both secular and religious 
ends, an examination of the means used is necessary to determine whether the 
state could have reasonably attained the secular end by means which do not 
further the promotion of religion.n18 The Court set forth the following cri-
teria for determining whether or not an institution was sectarian: 1) the stated 
purpose of the college, 2) college personnel - administration, faculty governing 
board, and student body - with emphasis on substantiality of religious control, 
3) place of religion in college program, 4) relationship to sponsoring reli-
gious organization including extent of ownership, financial assistance and con-
trol, 5) results of the college's program such as accreditation and nature of 
activities of alumni, and, 6) work and image of the college in the community. 
The Court concluded that under these criteria, Hood was non-sectarian, while 
15western Maryland-Methodist; Notre Dame and St. Joseph's - Roman Catholic. 
~ · U IB. Horace Mann .I· Board, .Q.2.Cit., p.66. ill!·, p.63. ~., p.61. 
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Western Maryland College was "sectarian in the legal sense under the.First 
Amendment and may not constitutionally receive the grants named in the Bi11. 1119 
Among other things, its charter required that one-third of the Board be Metho-
dist ministers so as to give the clergy a veto; the Board was heavily Methodist 
and nearly all Protestant; the faculty was committed to a Christian philosophy; 
and an atheist would not be employed.. As to the two Catholic colleges, whose 
student bodies were 97 to 100 percent Catholic, the Court said "the whole life 
is lived in a Catholic atmosphere which assumes earthly life is to be lived in 
preparation for future life with God."20 Granting aid to the above colleges 
would be using the coercive power of the state to materially aid religion. The 
dissenting judges, on the other hand, were of the opinion that grants to build 
a dining ball and science buildings were not an Establishment of religion.21 
Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the decision but the Supreme Court 
refused to review, with Justices Stewart and Harlan indicating that the cases 
should have been set down for consideration.22 
The Maryland Court accepted the fact that the institution benefited from 
the tax aid, regardless of the purpose of the aid. Where the institution was 
a sectarian religious institution, the Court found that the coercive power of 
the state served to materially aid that institution. A religious means (grants 
19Ibid., pp.68-9. 
20Ibid. , p. 71. 
21.rhe majority left the door open when they said that the legislature was 
prohibited from taxing except for a public purpose, and Maryland has not yet de-
clared universal higher education a public purpose of the state. The Court also 
indicated that the case was decided under the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 
''law of the land" provision, it was the equivalent of the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment which included the First Amendment. pp.7'3-76. 
2~oard of Public ~ of Mar:yland .!." Horace Mann League of ~ United 
States of America, Inc .. cert. denied #473, November 14, 1966 _ U .s._, 
17 L. ed 2d 195 (1966); Horace~ League .!.• Board .Q! Public Works, appeal 
dismissed #590, November 14, 1966, _U.S._, 17 L ed 2d 195 (1966). 
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to sectarian colleges) was used to attain a secular purpose (promote higher 
education), which could have been attained through secular means (grants to 
non-sectarian colleges), therefore, a public purpose was not served. The 
11child-benefit11 theory is a most appealing one, and if the child can be com-
pletely divorced from the institution, the Supreme Court could properly find 
that a public purpose is being served. However, where a religious institution 
materially benefits from the coercive taxing power of the state, regardless of 
the benefit to the individual, there would appear to be an Establishment of 
religion in violation of the First Amendment. This approach follows the spirit 
of the First Amendment, as well as the Court's own precedents as set forth in 
McCollum, ~. Schempp, and the dicta in. Everson. 
EPILOGUE 
Controversies over the relationship of church and state have plagued 
society from the beginning of recorded history. The Founding Fathers, in the 
Constitution and Bill of Rights, attempted to define that relationship for the 
United States. In the first part of this paper, I have cited every mention of 
religion in the fundamental documents of the New Nation. The fact of the matter 
is that there was very little discussion of religion. Can we, or should we try 
to ascertain the intention of the Founding Fathers from this meager evidence? 
Every man, being a different and distinct individual, unavoidably 
has intentions somewhat different from those of every one else. 
Such a thing as a solid, completely unified intention of all the 
members in any group would be hard if not impossible to find.l 
To cite the words of ~Iadison or Jefferson as embodying the intentions of the 
many men who participated in these deliberations, is not only inaccurate but 
misleading. To attempt to assign specific intentions to these men with regard 
to prayers and Bible reading, school buses, etc., is equally misleading. 
Intentions are highly subjective and personal things. They are not 
like badges pinned to a coat lapel. They lie deep in the hearts and 
minds of men. They are not always clearly stated by those who have 
them, nor even capable of clear and specific formulation. The words 
used to convey them seldom do so perfectly.2 
1w1111am Anderson, ttintention of the Framers: A Note on Constitutional 
Interpretation,•t 49 Am. Pol. Sci, Rev. 34, (1955). 
2Ibid. 
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Although we cannot ascertain exact intentions, we can find broad general prin-
ciples in the words they used. The spirit of independence and liberty, the 
freedom from compulsion, the resentment of domination by an external imposed 
power, the equality of man, and the firm belief that every man has the right 
to choose for himself the pattern of his belief - these ideas are implicit in 
every word they wrote and said. These ideas should be the guidelines in any 
problem which affects the "inalienable rights of man." Today's Supreme Court 
ls following in the tradition of the Founding Fathers in protecting those 
rightse 
Interpretation of the religion clauses of the Constitution is at issue 
today precisely because the exact intentions of the Framers are not clear. 
The Supreme Court had no precedent to guide it in 1947 when it decided the 
Everson case. The Court, however, has developed guidelines for the nation in 
that most sensitive area involving man and religion - based not on the specific 
words of the Constitution, but on that same spirit of freedom and liberty that 
guided the Founding Fathers almost two hundred years ago. 
APPENDIX 
There are three other recent Supreme Court decisions which, although not 
directly concerning the schools, do have a bearing on the interpretation of the 
Establishment clause of the First Amendment. The first of these is another 
~laryland case, Torasco .!.o Watkins, decided in 1961.1 Roy Torasco, elected a 
Notary Public, refused to take the compulsory oath of office 8.ffirming his be-
lief in God as required by the Maryland Constitution, and was denied his com-
mission. Justice Black, speaking for e unanimous Court (with Frankfurter and 
Harlan concurring in the result), repeated ani reaffirmed the definition of 
Establishment set forth in the Everson case, and added, "Neither State nor 
Federal governments can constitutionally pass laws nor impose requirements 
which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those 
religions based on a belief in the existance of God as against those religions 
founded on different beliefs."2 He said the power and authority of the State 
of Maryland are put on the side of a particular sort of believers - that is, 
those who profess belief in God, but the State cannot constitutionally force a 
person to "profess belief or disbelief in any religion.3 It is not clear, how-
ever, whether the decision is based on Establishment or Free Exercise, since 
1367 U.S. 488 (196l)o The Constitutions of five other States required 
atheistic tests; Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Tennesseeo 
2Ibid., po492. 
Justice Black argued the former, but concluded that the test unconstitutionally 
invaded appellant's freedom of belief o 
In the Conscientious Objector cases4 the Court had before it a section of 
the Selective Service Act which granted exemption from military duties to those 
who objected because of their "religious training and beliefs... This was de-
fined in the Act as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being 
involving duties superior to those arising from any hmnan relation, but fi.ot 
includin.g/" essentially political, sociological, or philosophical means or a 
merely personal code... The statute had been amended by Congress in 1940 from 
0 Belief in God" to "Belief in a Supreme Being." The Act was attacked as being 
a violation of both the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses. The Court up-
held the statute, and found that all three of the young men, none of whom pro-
fessed to a belief in a Supreme Being, were eligible for exemptions from 
military service. In so holding, the Court said the test is "whether a given 
belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in. the life of its 
pocessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who 
clearly qualifies for exemption."5 By so deciding, the Court avoided a con-
stitutional question, and broadened the definition of religious beliefs so as 
to include those which are non-deistico Had Congress not changed the statute, 
the Court might well have found an Establishment under Torasco. 
6 . In the Sunday Closing ,W cases which preceeded Engel and Schempp by a 
year, the Sunday closing laws of several states were c~llenged under both the 
Establishment and Free Exercise clauses. It was claimed that by requiring 
4uos. v., Sew, .!!.& .!.• Jakobson, ~ i· U.S., _U.S. _, 85 Sup.Ct. 
850, (1965)7 
5Ibid. 
6r.icGowan v. land, 366 U oS. 420, (1961); Two Guys .!.• McGinle}, (Pa.) 
366 UoS., 582, \1961 ; Gallagher.!.• Crown Kosher Super Market, (Mass. , 366 
u.s. 617, (1961). 
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businesses to be closed on Sunday, the tenets of Christianity were imposed on 
the communityo7 Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the majority, rejected this 
contention. In a rather fuzzy decision, he conceded that Sunday laws were orig-
inally religious in character - the issue before the Court was whether they were 
still religious in charactere8 He concluded that they were not, and, there-
fore, do not violate the First Amendment. He pointed out that many of our 
criminal laws have their root in religious teachings (bigamy, murder, etc.) 
but that doesn't make them Establishmento He affirmed the Everson rules regard-
ing Establlshment,9 distinguished the instant case from McCollum (the only case 
up to that time in which Establishment was found) in that there is no compul-
sion to attend church, no direct cooperation or participation by church and 
church authorities, and no tax money to aid religion; 10 and concluded that 0 to 
say that a state cannot prescribe Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes 
solely because centuries ago such laws had their genesis in religion would be 
giving a constitutional interpretation of hostility to the public welfare 
rather than one of mere separation of church and state."11 He cautioned, how-
ever, that Sunday legislation may violate the Establishment clause if it can be 
demonstrated that "its purpose - evidenced either on the face of the legisla-
tion, in conjunction with its legislative history, or in its operative effect -
is to use the States' coercive power to aid religion."12 
Frankfurter, joined by Harlan, in a lengthy, comprehensive, detailed con-
curring opinion, defined the purpose of the two religion clauses of the First 
Amendmento The Free Exercise clause serves to protect unpopular creeds, l3 
while the Establishment clause is ttto assure that the national legislature 
7 McGowan, .Q:Q.ci t. , ppo43Q,431. lOibid., p.452. 13 Ibid., p.464. 
8Ibid .. , p.431. 11Ibid., p.445. 
9Ibid., p.4430 12Ibid., p.453. 
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would not exert its power in the service of any purely religious end; it would 
not, ••• make of religion, as religion, an object of legislation .. "14 The Estab-
lishment clause and the fundamental separationist concept which it expresses is 
not concerned with regulations which have other objectives.15 The state can 
reasonably find Sunday a socially desirable day of surcease from subjection to 
labor and routine - from this cannot be derived a purpose to establish or pro-
mote religion. Even though another day could be set aside, it would not be as 
effective since different members of the family might have different days off, 
it would be difficult to enforce, etc.; he thus rejected the contention that 
Sabbatarians be given an alternative so that they would not be at a competitive 
disadvantage,16 for, in view of the community interests which mu,st be weighed 
in the balance, the disadvantage wrought by non-exempting Sunday statutes is 
not an impermissible imposition on the Sabbatarians' freedome 
Douglas vehemently disagreed, he would declare the laws unconstitutional 
as to those complaining,17 and added that in the case of the Orthodox Jew, the 
vice is accentuated. For Douglas, the question is 0 whether the State can im-
pose criminal sanctions on those who unlike the Christian majority that makes 
up our society, worship on a different day or do not share the religious 
scruples of the majority." He objected that the Court, once having arrived at 
a general benefit and, therefore, no Establishment, dismissed all other objec-
tions as coming within the scope of the legislature's discretion. In other 
words, although there is no Establishment which voids the statute, its applica-
tion to the Orthodox Jew plaintiff violates his right of Free Exercise since his 
religion requires him to maintain another day of rest, and, therefore, is un-
constitutional in its application to him. 
' . 
14Ibid., p.465. 15Ibid., p.466. 16Ibid., p.520. 
l7Douglas is joined b;y Brennan and Stewart in his dissent in Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.So 617, (1961), the case which involved a Kosher meat market and 
the Pennsylvania Sunday Closing laws. 
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